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CONSTITUTIONAL SAFETY VALVE:
THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND
STATUS REGIMES IN A FEDERALIST SYSTEM
Bruce E. Boyden*
ABSTRACT
The American Constitution was born flawed: it failed to provide a me-
chanism for resolving entrenched differences in the social status regimes 
between states. This Article argues that part of the purpose of the Privileg-
es or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was to correct that 
flaw. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was the culmination of a long 
antebellum debate over whether southern states had to respect the rights of 
northern black citizens as they traveled. The Clause achieves this goal by 
requiring states in certain circumstances to respect the status determina-
tions of other states when the citizens of those other states travel. Although 
this aspect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has long been forgotten, 
it survived the Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases. 
And there is a good chance it will soon be needed again. The United 
States is on the verge of an entrenched conflict between states concerning 
the recognition of the status of marriage for same-sex couples. Although 
multiple resolutions are possible, the forgotten component of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause may provide a more stable and effective framework 
for determining when states must respect the status determinations of other 
states. As a structural remedy rather than one based solely on individual 
rights, the Clause’s protection for state status determinations is only trig-
gered when a critical mass of states line up for or against recognizing the 
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status at issue. As a result, the Clause’s protection for state status deter-
minations is more limited than other rights but potentially more attractive 
for courts disinclined to greatly expand existing doctrine. If a substantial 
number of states grant same-sex marriages, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause will require the rest of the states to recognize those marriages for 
travelers. 
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Suppose that Ohio, still further afflicted with her peculiar phi-
lanthropy, should determine to descend another grade in the scale 
of her peculiar humanity, and claim to confer citizenship on the 
chimpanzee or the ourang-outang (the most respectable of the 
monkey tribe), are we to be told that “comity” will require of the 
States not thus demented, to forget their own policy and self-
respect, and lower their own citizens and institutions in the scale 
of being, to meet the necessities of the mongrel race thus attempted 
to be introduced into the family of sisters in this confederacy?1
 1. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 264 (1859) (emphasis omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to accomplish many things. 
It set forth a plan under which former Confederate states could rejoin the 
Union.2 It continued the work of the Thirteenth Amendment in destroying 
the racial caste system in the South.3 More generally, it expanded upon the 
rights and liberties of Americans by protecting them from incursion by 
state governments as well as by the federal government. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment did something else as well. It resolved 
a long-running dispute over the obligation of states to respect each other’s 
legal determinations of social status. That is, in the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause,4 the Fourteenth Amendment responded to the questions above 
posed in 1859 by Justice William Harris of the Mississippi High Court of 
Errors and Appeals. Harris’s opinion in Mitchell v. Wells, rejecting the 
claim of a former Mississippi slave who had become a free citizen in 
Ohio, was one of the last antebellum blows on behalf of the argument that 
states had unfettered power to refuse to recognize legal statuses bestowed 
by fellow states on their citizens.5 That argument was finally and decisive-
ly rejected by the Reconstruction Congress; part of the purpose of the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause was to override arguments like Harris’s. 
This animating purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has 
largely been forgotten. But the problem that gave rise to it, although long 
dormant, is not totally extinct. And in fact, it may erupt again over the 
issue of same-sex marriage. This Article argues that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause may have a role to play in resolving interstate conflicts 
over the recognition of the marriage rights of traveling same-sex couples. 
Currently, when two male citizens of Massachusetts, whom Massachusetts 
has determined to have the social and legal status of marriage, travel to, 
for example, Louisiana, Louisiana will refuse to recognize Massachu-
setts’s status determination as to those individuals. If a sufficient number 
of other states join Massachusetts, the situation will become the precise 
analogue of what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment tried to pre-
vent: the refusal by southern and western states to recognize the state citi-
 2. Sections 2 through 4 of the Amendment are most clearly directed to this end. It is easy to 
forget that, while Section 1 is the most important provision for us today, the reconstruction of the 
Union was by far the most pressing issue in 1866. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, 
The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 272 (1984) (“Most 
of the debate on the fourteenth amendment concerned the now-forgotten provisions of sections 2 and 
3.”). 
 3. This was perhaps the most significant intended purpose of Section 1, as enforced under Sec-
tion 5. 
 4. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 12 
(1981). 
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zenship status of northern black citizens. As I demonstrate below, the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause was designed to intervene at that point, and 
require recognition of a contested status granted by the travelers’ home 
state. 
This aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment is hardly the only one to 
have fallen by the wayside over time. The broad language of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment6 is famously difficult to interpret with preci-
sion. As a result, it has provided overlapping solutions to many of the 
problems the Amendment was designed to address. Even after the Su-
preme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases7 drastically reduced the role of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Court later jury-rigged constitu-
tional protections for equality out of the Equal Protection Clause8 and for 
fundamental individual rights out of the Due Process Clause.9 Although 
scholars continue to be very interested in the precise textual basis for both 
of these programs, the Supreme Court has, until recently, shown little 
interest in revisiting the matter.10
Despite its desuetude in the courts, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause has been the subject of a considerable amount of scholarship. The 
vast bulk of that scholarship has focused on what the Privileges or Immun-
 6. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 8. The process began with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), which applied the 
Equal Protection Clause to overturn, not a failure by a state to enforce its law equally, but an unequal 
law—namely, a law barring blacks from jury service. This reading was made explicit seven years later 
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886): “[T]he equal protection of the laws is a pledge of 
the protection of equal laws.” 
 9. As early as 1897, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that took land for public use 
without just compensation, as would have been required under the Fifth Amendment, as violative of 
the Due Process Clause. See Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Be-
ginning in the 1920s, the Court began finding elements of the Bill of Rights reflected in the liberty 
interests protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (assuming that “freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal 
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impair-
ment by the States”). 
 10. A spark of interest was demonstrated in the October 2009 term when the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in McDonald v. City of Chicago, and set down as the question presented “[w]hether 
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at i, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 1640363, at *i. But 
that was explained by the fact that one vote—Justice Thomas’s—depended on whether incorporation 
was accomplished via the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause. See
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–59 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing willingness to reconsider meaning of Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause in an “appropriate case”); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 
(1989). The plurality in McDonald rejected the opportunity to revisit Slaughter-House out of hand. See
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 (opinion of Alito, J.). 
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ities Clause was originally intended to accomplish in relation to the two 
other clauses in the same sentence: the Due Process Clause and Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Many scholars have taken the position that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause was intended to set substantive limits on state ac-
tions, namely by protecting a fixed set of “privileges” and “immunities,” 
specifically those belonging to “citizens of the United States.”11 Rather 
sharp disputes have arisen over what that list of privileges and immunities 
might consist of: the first eight Amendments to the Constitution,12 some 
subset of that,13 a superset of that,14 the provisions of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866,15 or something else entirely.16 Other scholars have asserted that 
the entire enterprise of coming up with a fixed list of privileges and im-
munities is misguided, and that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
actually an antidiscrimination provision, not a substantive provision, in-
tended only to prohibit states from discriminating in whatever “privileges 
[and] immunities” they might accord their own citizens.17 It was, in other 
words, what we now believe the Equal Protection Clause to be. Finally, 
some scholars have simply given up, despairing of the possibility that any 
 11. Just one of many interpretive difficulties is the precise way to read “privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States.” Is the phrase “of citizens of the United States” intended to limit the 
set of privileges and immunities at issue, or merely describe them? See Christopher R. Green, McDo-
nald v. Chicago, the Meaning-Application Distinction, and “Of” in the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 24 (2010) (identifying six possible mean-
ings). 
 12. This was Justice Hugo Black’s proposal for how to accomplish incorporation. See Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 (1964). Some subsequent scholars have taken the same view. See, e.g., William Crosskey, 
Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1954). 
 13. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193 (1992) (setting forth theory of “refined incorporation”); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869 (1990) (opining that the Clause protected a limited 
set of civil rights); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). 
 14. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (stating that Clause incorporated Bill of Rights and 
various other rights against states); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era 
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986) (stating that Clause empowers the 
national government to protect rights of U.S. citizens). 
 15. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
 16. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 28
(1980) (stating that most plausible interpretation of Clause is “that it was a delegation to future consti-
tutional decision-makers to protect certain rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaus-
tively, nor even in any specific way gives directions for finding”). 
 17. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 
1385 (1992); DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS 1789–1888, at 342–51 (1992). Somewhat related is Philip Hamburger’s argument in a forth-
coming article that the Clause was intended only to ensure equal treatment of black citizens from other 
states. See Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). In 
either case, the Clause is devoid of any substantive content. 
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determinate meaning for the Privileges or Immunities Clause will ever be 
found.18
Given that we now have most of the evidence that we will ever have, 
that debate seems unlikely to be definitively resolved.19 The problem is 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted by a committee20 and then 
debated by politicians. The sweeping terms of the second sentence of Sec-
tion 1 bear the hallmarks of language that achieves compromise by em-
bracing multiple possibilities, to be sorted out later. The debates in Con-
gress reflect this; the proponents of each of the interpretations mentioned 
above is able to find some, but not conclusive, support for their positions. 
Recent scholarship has therefore sought meaning, not in the framing de-
bates, but in the way the language of Section 1 may have been understood 
by the contemporary public.21 Even there, however, the results so far are 
inconclusive.22 Fortunately, it’s not clear that any of this makes any prac-
 18. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 166 (describing Privileges or Immunities Clause as inscrutable, as if it had been obliterated 
by an “ink blot”); CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, PART ONE, at 
1297 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: The History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
vol. 6, 1971) (citing Reverdy Johnson’s statement that he did not “understand . . . the effect” of the 
Clause as indication that it “did not have a definite meaning.”). 
 19. See ELY, supra note 16, at 25 (“[P]eople are coming to realize that this is an argument no one 
can win.”). 
 20. Earl Maltz has offered a persuasive account of the committee compromises that led to the 
second sentence of Section 1 being placed in the proposed Amendment. See MALTZ, supra note 13, at 
79–92 (1990). Most of the text of the Amendment emerged from secret debates by the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction, a committee of fifteen members from the House and Senate. Rep. John Bing-
ham of Ohio proposed adding the language that became the second sentence of Section 1, but it was 
voted down by many of his fellow Republicans in favor of language that more directly outlawed dis-
crimination on the basis of race. Maltz argues that some of the Radical Republicans on the committee 
eventually changed their minds because they “also had to consider the problem of drafting an amend-
ment that would pass.” Id. at 91. Maltz argues that in order to serve this purpose, the rights protected 
by the language must have been more narrow, id. at 92, but it seems just as likely that the language 
was simply more vague. 
 21. One increasingly popular method of constitutional interpretation is to look at the original 
public meaning of the text of a constitutional provision at the time of adoption. See, e.g., Lawrence B. 
Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409 (2009); Bryan H. 
Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509 (2007); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of 
Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867–73, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 153 (2009). But see Barry Friedman, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Some Problems 
for Originalists (and Everyone Else, Too), 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of 
Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361 (2009). Although currently in vogue, the method is 
not without precedent. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219–20 (1920) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“I think that the word ‘incomes’ in the Sixteenth Amendment should be read in ‘a sense 
most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption.’ For it was for public adoption 
that it was proposed.”) (quoting Bishop v. State, 48 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ind. 1898)); 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 406 (1st ed. 1833) (“Nothing but 
the text itself was adopted by the people.”). 
 22. See, e.g., David Hardy, Original Popular Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
Reflected in the Print Media of 1866–68, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 695 (2009); George C. Thomas III, 
Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment: What Did the American Public Know About Section 1?,
18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 323 (2009). 
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tical difference. Other than some amount of doctrinal purity,23 there is 
reason to believe that little has been lost by locating antidiscrimination 
norms and fundamental rights protections in the Equal Protection Clause 
and Due Process Clause, respectively.24
A more practically significant inquiry would be whether anything 
would be lost by ignoring the Privileges or Immunities Clause that cannot 
easily be located in some other provision of the Constitution. One right 
that is at least partially within the scope of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is the right to travel. But that right—or rather, collection of 
rights25—is actually protected by a surfeit of constitutional provisions; the 
difficulty has been correlating each component of the right with a particu-
lar provision.26
That brings us back to the problem identified at the beginning of this 
Article. The American Constitution was born flawed, not only in its pro-
tection of slavery, but also in a related but far more subtle way: it failed to 
provide for a certain uniformity of social status in the United States. These 
flaws were no accident. The framers, still suspicious of a strong centra-
lized government, established a system of dual, partially overlapping sove-
reignties: the national government would be wholly responsible for some 
matters, the state governments for others, and the two would share respon-
 23. For example, Akhil Amar argues that the most natural reading of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is that it incorporates rights of citizens found in the Bill of Rights against the states. See Amar, 
supra note 13, at 1220–23. Reading the Clause that way would avoid the need to interpret a clause 
about process as having something to do with substance. See ELY, supra note 16, at 18 
(“‘[S]ubstantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel redness.’”). John 
Harrison argues that the Clause is the only logical home for Congress’s intended constitutionalization 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which forbade racial discrimination. See Harrison, supra note 17, at 
1402–10. 
 24. See Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1241, 1243 (1998) (“Overruling Slaughter-House would solve so few of the problems in modern 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that it’s not clear that a textualist revival would be worth the 
trouble.”). 
 25. The Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489(1999), found “at least three different 
components” of the right to travel: “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another 
State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily 
present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right 
to be treated like other citizens of that State.” Id. at 500. Only the third component was explicitly 
connected to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See id. at 502–03. 
 26. The textual basis for the right to travel has been located in the Commerce Clause, see Ed-
wards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1941); the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th 
Amendment, see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); the Equal Protection Clause, see
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630, 633 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); the Due Process Clause, see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); 
or some combination thereof, see Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986) 
(Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Commerce Clause, and the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause). On several occasions the Court has refused to specify a textual source, stating that “a 
right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger 
Union the Constitution created.” United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); see also Saenz,
526 U.S. at 500. 
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sibility for the remainder. Among the questions left entirely to the states 
were almost all determinations of legal and social status,27 such as family 
law, criminal law, citizenship, suffrage, and—most controversially, then 
and now—slavery. 
This division of responsibilities assumed that a certain amount of simi-
larity in the social status hierarchies in each state would persist. That as-
sumption proved ill-founded, however. Societies evolve, sometimes in 
unexpected ways, and the new states were no exception. The invention of 
the cotton gin, and improved transportation links, cemented and expanded 
slavery’s role in the economic and social structure of southern states, 
while the development of a manufacturing economy in the North led to 
slavery’s gradual abolition there.28 These differences sparked repeated 
conflicts, beginning in 1820 and continuing up through the Civil War, 
over individuals caught between the two systems: free blacks. Blacks were 
regarded as citizens by some northern states but increasingly as agents of 
subversion in southern (and western) states. This conflict flared up repeat-
edly as the improvements in transportation and commerce that allowed the 
cotton trade to boom also allowed travelers, including black citizens, to 
roam around the nation. 
That conflict eventually bloomed into a legal conflict between lawyers 
and politicians in the northern and southern states over the issue of wheth-
er the rights of northern black citizens had to be respected as they travel.29
In the antebellum period, northern advocates argued that the failure of 
southern and western states to recognize the rights of northern black citi-
zens violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Southern 
apologists responded that Article IV required only that black northern citi-
zens be treated the same as similarly situated black residents of their 
states, not similarly situated citizens.30 In other words, they argued that in 
recognizing the status of citizenship, a host state could discriminate on the 
basis of qualities that the granting state did not. These arguments were 
expressly invoked by Republicans in Congress when they declared that one 
 27. This Article uses “status” to refer to two related concepts: social status and legal status. “So-
cial status” is a collective judgment about how much respect or honor to bestow upon a particular 
person; put differently, a determination of a person’s social status governs what rules of behavior 
others believe it is appropriate to apply to that person. Social status is usually enforced informally, 
through cultural education and social sanctions. “Legal status” refers to the placement of a person 
within a certain standing legal category (e.g., bankrupt). The purpose of this placement is to determine 
which legal rules should apply to that person. In some cases legal statuses formalize social statuses 
(e.g., marriage, conviction, or slavery). For more on the difference between legal and social status, 
see J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2324–26 (1997). 
28. See ANGELA LAKWETE, INVENTING THE COTTON GIN: MACHINE AND MYTH IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA 187 (2003). 
 29. See Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 305, 334–46 (1988). 
 30. See id. at 342–46. 
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purpose of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was to “enforce” the Pri-
vileges and Immunities Clause.31
This Article is one of the first to study the intellectual history of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause in order to recover this lost component.32
The conflict that occurred in the antebellum period is a potential issue for 
any federalist system. Whenever a nation places an upper bound on how 
far certain issues can percolate up through its legal system, that constraint 
risks allowing differences to persist unresolved, causing pressure to build 
around volatile issues. That is, a federal system is particularly susceptible 
to the emergence of an entrenched conflict between social status regimes 
contained in the subsidiary political units—the states. The framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment attempted to provide a solution for this problem in 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Their solution only becomes apparent 
by placing the clause in the historical context as the culmination of a long-
running debate over the rights of traveling state citizens.33
That solution, however, has long been forgotten as the issue has lain 
largely dormant. The Fourteenth Amendment in many ways has made the 
resolution of interstate conflict moot, as constitutional law directly regu-
lates status enforcement made through racial, gender-based, or a small 
number of other “suspect” classifications. That is, the particular status 
regime conflict that emerged prior to the Civil War could not recur, as the 
Equal Protection Clause makes it illegal for a state to discriminate against 
its own citizens on the basis of race, let alone those from another state. 
 31. See Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010) 
 32. Philip Hamburger, in a forthcoming article that will emerge in press contemporaneously with 
this one, argues for the interpretive significance of much of the same history that I review below. 
However, the conclusion Hamburger draws from that history is starkly different: that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause had only one originally intended purpose, and that that purpose was the rather 
narrow one of enforcing an antidiscrimination rule for traveling black citizens. See Hamburger, supra 
note 17. Other scholars have previously examined some of the same history but have not found in it 
any special meaning for the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Lash, supra note 31; Maltz, supra 
note 29, at 334–46; Akhil Reed Amar, Race, Religion, Gender and Interstate Federalism: Some Notes 
from History, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 19, 20–23 (1996); Roderick M. Hills Jr., Poverty, Residency, 
and Federalism: States’ Duty of Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 277, 285. 
 33. Several legal scholars and historians have long argued that the agenda of the Republicans in 
Congress has to be considered through the lens of abolitionist ideology, which motivated many of 
them. See, e.g., JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 232 (1965); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE 
LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2d ed. 
1995); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA,
1760–1848 (1977); Farber & Muench, supra note 2, at 241; Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the 
Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45 
(1987); Douglas G. Smith, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: Precursor of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809 (1997); Randy E. Barnett, 
Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment (Georgetown Pub. 
Law Research Paper No. 10-06, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538862. This work is enormously important. 
None of these scholars have focused directly on the traveling status problem, however, perhaps be-
cause it has faded from modern view. 
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But not all status conflicts raise an equal protection issue, as equal protec-
tion doctrine is currently understood. An issue falling in the gap between 
suspect classifications might elude a definitive national resolution, thus 
producing interstate conflict. 
Same-sex marriage presents just such a status conflict. Same-sex mar-
riages are currently granted in six jurisdictions.34 Three other states recog-
nize foreign state same-sex marriages.35 Same-sex marriage is the legal 
manifestation of changing social norms regarding the core statuses of sex-
ual orientation and, even more critically, gender. Other states have at-
tempted to buttress their existing status regimes by forbidding recognition 
of same-sex marriages by statute36 or even constitutional amendment,37
while Congress has passed a law declaring that same-sex marriages will be 
of no effect outside the ceremonial state.38 Such attempts at de-recognition 
 34. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Kerrigan v. Comm’r 
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); An Act 
Relative to Civil Marriage and Civil Unions, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2009); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009); Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 
2009, D.C. Code § 46-401(a) (Supp. 2010). California briefly granted same-sex marriages before its 
law was repealed in a voter initiative. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amending constitution to provide that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a 
woman is valid or recognized in California"). That initiative has been declared unconstitutional, see
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), but the order in the case has been 
stayed on appeal, see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 
2010). Maine’s legislature likewise passed a statute allowing same-sex marriages, only to have it 
repealed in a referendum before it could take effect. See An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Mar-
riage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Laws 150-51 (abrogated by people’s veto). Three 
states currently grant civil unions to same-sex couples, but two of those measures have been repealed 
in the face of pending same-sex marriage laws. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31 (2009); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-38oo (2009), repealed by 2009, P.A. 09-13, § 21 (effective Oct. 1, 2010); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1 (2009), repealed by 2009, 59:9 (effective Jan. 1, 2011). Several other 
states grant other forms of recognition to same-sex relationships. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-22-101–111 (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 527C-1–7 
(2009); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010-090 (2009); Oregon Family Fairness Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 106.300-340 (2009); WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001-18 (2009). 
 35. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2009) (providing recognition of foreign same-sex marriag-
es “with the sole exception of the designation of ‘marriage’”); 95 Op. Atty. Gen. 3 (Md. Feb. 23, 
2010), 2010 WL 886002; Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358 (2009). 
 36. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT § 572-1 (2009); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/212 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (2009); MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW.
§ 2-201 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2009); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1704 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-104 (2009); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2009). 
 37. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; 
ARK. CONST. amend. 83; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16; KY. CONST.
§ 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. ANN. art. XIV, 
§ 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art, XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, 
§ 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN.
CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. 
 38. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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only exacerbate the conflict. They raise the spectre of a patchwork of fun-
damental social understandings where marriages appear and disappear 
according to which state a traveler happens to be in, or in which court the 
marriage is raised as an issue. The official recognition of same-sex mar-
riages in a growing number of states, and the declaration of those mar-
riages as anathema in a number of others, indicates that a status regime 
conflict is emerging. The question is ripe for resolution at the national 
level. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause was tailor-made for this sort of 
situation. Other constitutional provisions, such as the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause, provide a more awkward fit, 
at least as currently understood. Current Equal Protection doctrine pro-
vides no ready method for extending the reach of the clause to new status 
regime conflicts, by postulating a new “suspect classification”—something 
that has not occurred for several decades.39 Likewise, the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause applies uncertainly to marriages, which are not clearly with-
in the scope of the clause, and would also generally have a destabilizing 
effect by nationalizing any change in a formalized social status such as 
marriage, in any state, the moment it occurred.40
The Privileges or Immunities Clause offers a structural remedy to the 
problem, based on how similar the conflict is to the one over black citi-
zens prior to the Civil War. Thus, if a status conflict between states reach-
es a kind of critical mass, similar to the division between states prior to 
the Civil War, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be triggered as 
to that dispute; it would require states to classify travelers for purposes of 
making legal status determination as they would be classified by their 
home states. In other words, if same-sex marriages are granted by a sig-
nificant number of states, are declared anathema in a significant number of 
others, and that conflict appears to be stable and unresolvable, the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause weighs in on the side of status recognition. 
The history of that clause shows that the Reconstruction Congress was 
crucially concerned that the rights of a class of citizens in one state, deni-
grated as a subordinate caste in another state, nevertheless receive equal 
respect as those citizens traveled. This aspect of the Clause survived the 
Slaughter-House Cases.
Part I of this Article explains in more detail the general nature of the 
problem federalism has with status regime conflicts. Part II then examines 
the antebellum conflict over the rights of free blacks, a conflict that be-
 39. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (holding alienage to be suspect 
classification). 
 40. See Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex 
Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191 (1996) (full faith and credit not re-
quired for marriages). 
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came the intellectual history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Part 
III then considers the evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
was intended to address that problem. Part IV applies the analysis to the 
emerging conflict over same-sex marriages, arguing that same-sex mar-
riage poses the same potential for entrenched status conflict that black citi-
zenship once did. The Article then concludes. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERALIST PROBLEM
The framers of the original Constitution were well aware that the 
states had different legal and social systems, and they sought to preserve a 
certain amount of heterogeneity through the architecture of federalism. At 
the same time, however, the framers realized that too much heterogeneity 
would lead to exactly the situation they sought to escape: the Articles of 
Confederation. The object was therefore to unify the formerly separate 
states without unifying them too much. Primarily this was achieved 
through delegating different powers to different levels of government—the 
national government would have power to do many things, but legal pro-
tections for status regimes were left to the states. The framers foresaw that 
even this division might not preserve sufficient heterogeneity: some status 
judgments were walled off from national debate entirely, such as the rule 
allowing the slave trade until 1808 and the rule providing for the return of 
fugitive slaves. When it came to unity, however, the Constitution was less 
specific. Unable to foresee exactly how the states would develop different-
ly, the Constitution calls for unity with vague protections of the “Privileg-
es and Immunities of Citizens,”41 “Full Faith and Credit,”42 and “republi-
can government.”43 No robust mechanism was elaborated in the Constitu-
tion to ensure that the minimum amount of similarity between state socie-
ties would be preserved. 
Instead, the framers presumed that the social unity of the new states 
would persist. For all the differences between the colonies, the framers 
were correct in perceiving a large amount of cultural similarity. They 
hoped that affinity between the colonies would fill in where national au-
thority was lacking. As John Jay stated, the Constitution was received and 
debated by 
one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, 
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached 
to the same principles of government, very similar in their man-
ners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and ef-
 41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 42. Id. § 1. 
 43. Id. § 4. 
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forts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, 
have nobly established their general liberty and independence.44
While the framers were anxious to improve upon the decentralized 
Confederation, they also wished to avoid the perceived evils of the King-
in-Parliament they had just left behind. They were sensitive to the charge 
of the Anti-Federalists that no nation as large as the thirteen states com-
bined could remain unified enough to preserve its republican character. 
Drawing on Montesquieu, the Anti-Federalists argued that any nation with 
the “varieties of climate, economic interests, religion, manners, and habits 
of the vast and scattered American population” would contain so many 
different interests and opinions that a single government would be unable 
to obtain a consensus on any issue without resorting to the use of force.45
The solution the framers arrived at was to give the national government 
power only over certain issues that crossed state boundaries, such as inter-
state and foreign trade, the postal system, war, and the military.46 The 
regulation of everyday life was largely left to the states, which had smaller 
societies more closely bound together.47
Reluctant as they were to create a strong national government, howev-
er, the framers recognized that some provision was necessary within the 
Constitution to ensure that the states did not grow apart rather than togeth-
er; that is, to compel the states to retain roughly consistent societies. Two 
preventative measures were inserted, as well as a number of largely horta-
tory calls for unity. While the new Constitution did not define citizenship, 
it did prevent the most extreme changes in citizenship status from occur-
ring through the Bill of Attainder and Titles of Nobility Clauses.48 The 
first of these helped to ensure that no subject classes could be created in 
America; the Bill of Attainder prohibition ensures that no single person, or 
 44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter all page 
references to The Federalist will be to this edition]; see also JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 284–85 (1978). It is possible that this unity of “manners 
and customs,” combined with the community spirit, existed for a relatively narrow time period. For an 
argument that a rising consumer market in British manufactured goods helped gel and standardize the 
political ideology of the Revolutionary era, see T.H. Breen, “Baubles of Britain”: The American and 
Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century, 119 PAST & PRESENT 73 (1988). 
 45. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 348 (enlarged 
ed. 1992); see also id. at 344, 349. 
 46. See Madison’s treatment of these powers in THE FEDERALIST NOS. 41–44 (James Madison). 
 47. See Bailyn, supra note 45, at 360.
 48. There are two Bill of Attainder Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, section 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of 
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”), and U.S. CONST. art. I, section 10, cl. 1 (“No State 
shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder”); the first prohibits the federal government from passing such 
bills, the second prohibits the states. There are also two Titles of Nobility Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
section 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States”), and U.S. CONST. art. I, 
section 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”), for the same reason. For discus-
sions of these clauses, see Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996) (Bill of Attainder Clauses); Balkin, supra note 27, at 2349–52. 
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no identifiable group of people, could be singled out for punishment for 
the crime of being themselves.49 The prohibition against granting titles of 
nobility ensured that the opposite would never occur either—that a ruling 
class would be created that could receive special benefits from the gov-
ernment for no just reason.50
The calls for unity were placed in Article IV. Most of the clauses of 
Article IV were designed, at base, to preserve the feelings of mutual at-
traction between states—that is, a degree of similitude in social status 
judgments.51 But the provisions were little more than promises. The Re-
publican Guaranty Clause52 only prohibited extreme departures from a 
republican form of government.53 The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
was declared in the Federalist Papers to be “the basis of the Union,”54 but 
no provision was made for its enforcement. The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause55 contained a provision authorizing Congress to prescribe the “ef-
fect” of proving acts, records, and judicial proceedings, but it was unclear 
what the underlying obligation of “full faith and credit” required.56
Beyond providing for some form of interstate res judicata, the framers 
offered no specific ideas for how the Clause might work.57
 49. As with everything, it is obvious that the framers only meant that no persons or group of 
people could be made outcasts relative to the status quo; obviously, given the existence of slaves, such 
a class already existed. 
 50. See Balkin, supra note 27 at 2350–51.
 51. As Bruce Ackerman has observed, the framers were aware that the feelings of attraction were 
at an all-time high just after the Revolution; it was all downhill from there. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 179 (1991) (“Publius [was] engaged in a grim race against time.”). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 53. As Madison noted in Federalist No. 43, the clause only gave the states the “right to insist that 
the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be substantially main-
tained.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 274 (James Madison). 
 54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton). The full text of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause reads: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”). The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is also known as the “Effect 
Clause.” 
 56. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson once reported, “I find no satisfactory evidence that the 
members of the Constitutional Convention or the early Congresses had more than a hazy knowledge of 
the problems they sought to settle or of those which they created by the faith and credit clause.” 
ROBERT JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE LAWYER’S CLAUSE 10 (1944). 
 57. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (“The power here established may be 
rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of 
contiguous States, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated in any 
stage of the process within a foreign jurisdiction.”). Two recent articles examining the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause have argued that the obligation to provide “full faith and credit” was simply an eviden-
tiary obligation, no different from the obligation in many treaties; it was only by the Effect Clause that 
the provision would impose any substantive obligations on states, through congressional legislation. 
See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584 (2009); Stephen E. 
Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201 (2009). 
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The framers believed, or at least hoped, that the inchoate provisions of 
Article IV would prove sufficient to keep the states in a close orbit. But 
the Revolution unleashed social changes far beyond what the framers an-
ticipated. While they had thrown off the shackles of the British Empire, 
the framers had no intention of changing the structure of society in the 
colonies. The Revolution was fought, in part, because the gentry in Amer-
ica were shut out of the most lucrative and prestigious colonial govern-
ment posts.58 The aim of the framers, then, was to throw off as much of 
the status hierarchy as existed above them—but no more. Yet, between the 
end of the Revolution and about 1830, this process of de-emphasizing the 
privileges of status became generalized throughout the nation. Yeomen 
and laborers throughout the states took phrases such as “all Men are 
created equal”59 to mean not only that the colonial elites deserved an equal 
share of the political pie as British elites, but that commoners and elites 
were on the same political and social level.60
Within a generation the first status conflict became clear. Some states 
developed into societies that prohibited certain fundamental divisions be-
tween residents, most notably between slaves and free people; other states’ 
societies increasingly required strict social and legal classifications along 
racial lines. In expanding the United States into new territories, and in 
identifying who qualified as “We the People,”61 the national community 
was pressured more and more to adopt one principle as to the ideal citi-
zenship status of blacks, both slave and free. The direction the debate took 
was shaped, and perhaps prolonged, by the federal structure the framers 
had established—before the nation could determine what rule to adopt, it 
first had to determine who could prescribe such rules under the legal sys-
tem. That is, politicians and judges of the time argued over the issue of 
which community had the authority to prescribe the necessary status regu-
lations: the community where the free or slave black originated, the com-
munity where such an individual traveled, or whether some national rule 
could be found to govern all situations. The debate over black citizenship 
thus fell into the gap of the vague unification clauses of Article IV. 
What the framers had failed to anticipate was the emergence of a sta-
tus regime conflict. A status regime conflict is a long-term dispute be-
tween two or more communities over the proper way to accord social sta-
tus to individuals. It is a particular challenge for federalist societies that 
 58. See BAILYN, supra note 45, at 99–100, 102, 204. As Bailyn has shown elsewhere, this con-
cern with status on the part of colonial elites had deep roots in colonial history. See Bernard Bailyn, 
Politics and Social Structure in Virginia, in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 90 (J.M. Smith ed., 
1959). 
 59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 60. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 271–86 (1991); 
ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1995). 
 61. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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apportion ultimate decision-making authority for status regulation to states. 
Social status is a core component of a person’s identity and self-worth. It 
is the measure of the amount of “prestige, esteem, standing, [or] distinc-
tion” accorded by a community to a person or group.62 Status is a collec-
tive judgment as to how one is performing in one’s various roles—citizen, 
friend, neighbor, law professor, mother, black woman. Because it is a 
collective judgment, it relies on some amount of uniformity within the 
community in making status determinations—in other words, a status re-
gime. 
A conflict between status regimes is particularly destabilizing because 
status regimes are, despite their importance, fragile. While cultural change 
is ordinarily glacial, once it reaches a critical tipping point, a community’s 
norms and status determinations might shift in a landslide. That is because 
of “network effects” in social practices such as norm enforcement: the 
value of outwardly espousing and enforcing a given norm depends heavily 
on how many other people in the community support the same norm.63
The result is that, while there is a large amount of inertia in any status 
regime, once it does begin to change it will likely do so in a cascade.64
Even the possibility of such a fundamental shift will drive groups that 
identify with the current status hierarchy to become hypersensitive to de-
viant status determinations, particularly those determinations that distin-
guish them from groups and persons with lesser status.65 Those with the 
 62. Elvin Hatch, Theories of Social Honor, 91 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 341, 341 (1989); see also
J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 12 & n.20 (1998). 
 63. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 160–61 & fig. 3 (1984). This 
phenomenon is also known as the “bandwagon effect.” The concept has been popularized recently in 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE
(2002). A “tipping point,” cascade, or bandwagon effect takes place when individuals place a high 
value on group cohesion relative to the benefits of a particular choice, and the number of individuals 
choosing an alternative crosses a certain threshold. See generally id.
 64. See Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the 
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997); see also Natalie S. Glance & Bernardo A. 
Huberman, The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas, SCI. AM., Mar. 1994, at 76, 78–79; Daniel Kahneman 
& Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984); Richard H. 
McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992). In Glance and Huberman’s metaphor, a 
cultural belief that is held only because of the attraction individuals feel toward holding the same belief 
as others is in an unstable state, like a ball in a small rut halfway down a hillside. If the ball is given a 
sufficiently large nudge, i.e., if a sufficient number of people are willing to switch beliefs, the others 
may follow and the ball may overcome the rut and roll all the way to the bottom of the hill, a prefera-
ble and more stable state. See infra figs. 1 & 2, p. 175. 
 65. See Balkin, supra note 27, at 2328, 2334; Pat Lauderdale et al., External Threat and the 
Definition of Deviance, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1058 (1984); Sabine Otten et al., Inter-
group Discrimination in Positive and Negative Outcome Allocations, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 568, 573, 578 (1996); A. Wade Smith, Racial Tolerance as a Function of Group 
Position, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 558 (1981). As Balkin observes, this leads to “the paradox of status”: 
“The paradox of status is that intense social conflict between status groups emerges not at the height of 
a system of social stratification but during its decline.” Balkin, supra note 27, at 2334. When upper-
level groups no longer feel the need to prove their dominance, their attention to status distinctions 
lags, and a more fluid intercourse between status groups is possible. When one side is clearly domi-
nant, it can easily laugh at the other side. See JAMES H. MERRELL, THE INDIANS’ NEW WORLD:
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most to lose will feel the most threatened by the challenge and will take 
the greatest action.66
One of the most destabilizing types of conflicts that can emerge is a 
difference between coequal sovereigns as to whether to formally recognize 
a person’s social status in law. A legal status, unlike a social status, does 
not simply disappear if it is disregarded within a certain community. As a 
result, the very presence of an individual with a contested socio-legal sta-
tus undermines an inconsistent status regime.67 That is what drove the con-
flict over free blacks in the antebellum era, and what is driving the conflict 
over same-sex marriage now. 
II. THE FAILURE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION
Despite the fact that the framers failed to perceive the devastating po-
tential of a status regime conflict, their plan worked for several decades. 
Interpreters largely approached such phrases as “We, the People,” “all 
men are created equal,” “full faith and credit,” “privileges and immuni-
ties,” and “citizens” from the same vantage point and gave them consis-
tent meanings.68 As the decades progressed, however, profound changes in 
the underlying structure of American society69 both obliterated the pre-
sumed interpretive unity of the founding generation and, at the same time, 
required more of it. Americans simultaneously became one national com-
munity and two sectional societies, with southerners becoming increasing-
ly attached to an economic system based on slavery and a status hierarchy 
based on race,70 while northerners thrived in an economy based increa-
CATAWBAS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS FROM EUROPEAN CONTACT THROUGH THE ERA OF REMOVAL 46–
47, 225 (1991). 
66. See Balkin, supra note 27, at 2334; Lauderdale et al., supra note 65, at 1067.
 67. See RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER 
AMERICAN LAW, xii, 3 (1996) (noting disruptiveness of “hybrids”); Judy Scales-Trent, Commonali-
ties: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305, 324 (1990) 
(“[W]hat is there about a continuum that is unsatisfying? frightening? Why must life—and we—be seen 
in either ‘black’ or ‘white,’ with no shades in between?”). 
 68. As Bruce Ackerman has noted, this sort of interpretive uniformity is a common feature of, and 
problem with, founding generations. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 179 
(1991). 
 69. See WOOD, supra note 60, at 287–305. For a perceptive overview of the role of religious 
ideology in the beginnings of the antislavery movement in America, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE
PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770–1823 (1975). For an attempt to locate the 
causes of the rise of antislavery in the 1820s and ‘30s, see RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY 
APPEAL: AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM AFTER 1830 (1976). As Eric Foner has noted, however, the rise 
of antislavery, and its exact connection to general societal changes in the North, has yet to be ex-
plained. See ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 23–24 (1980). 
 70. The classic work is WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES 
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550–1812 (1968); see also George M. Fredrickson, Masters and Mudsills: The 
Role of Race in the Planter Ideology of South Carolina, in THE ARROGANCE OF RACE: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SLAVERY, RACISM AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY 15 (1978); JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY 
AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 129–33 (1990). 
69
128 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 62:1:111 
singly on wage labor and in a society where no one owned slaves.71 As 
their realities changed, so did their interpretive frameworks, putting sharp 
tensions on the application of their inherited principles—and therefore on 
the nature of the union itself. The conflict came to a head in a dispute over 
one set of individuals that pulled hardest at all of the assumptions: black 
Americans. 
The conflict over slavery is well-known. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, American politics was in turmoil over the continued existence and 
extension of slavery throughout the United States, leading to profound 
debates over the conditions for admitting new states and territories and the 
status of slavery therein. Some of the most famous political episodes of the 
time concerned these issues: the Missouri debate, the Compromise of 
1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott decision. The issue was 
definitively resolved when slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1865.72
But there was another aspect of the debate, salient at the time, which 
is crucial to understanding the history of the Fourteenth Amendment: the 
rights of free black citizens of Northern states. It was this aspect of the 
debate that formed a crucial part of the historical background for the Four-
teenth Amendment. As noted below, the debate shows all of the hallmarks 
of a status regime conflict, demonstrating patterns that will recur in the 
1990s debate over same-sex marriage. Four elements of the antebellum 
debate are considered here. The rights of traveling Northern black citizens 
were a prominent part of the Missouri debate in 1820–1821; the issue 
cropped up again regularly thereafter in response to Southern state laws 
restricting the movements of black seamen.73 Similarly, the furor over the 
apprehension of alleged fugitive slaves in the North without legal process 
focused attention on the rights of black Northern citizens. That issue grew 
in importance as the Supreme Court and then Congress strengthened the 
rights of Southern slaveholders to act with impunity in the North. Finally, 
Northern demands for respect for the rights of free blacks were an impor-
tant component of the demise of comity between state courts that occurred 
just prior to the Civil War. The Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott deci-
sion, attempted to resolve the question in 1857 by essentially declaring 
Northern black citizens to be without enforceable rights outside their home 
states—a holding that was directly addressed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.74
 71. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR xv, xvii, xxiv (2d ed. 1995) (free labor ideology began to develop in 
the 1830s).  
 72. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII  
 73. See MARTHA S. PUTNEY, BLACK SAILORS: AFRO-AMERICAN MERCHANT SEAMEN AND 
WHALEMEN PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR 13 (1987). 
 74. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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A. The Presumption of Comity 
For several years after the Founding, the differences between the 
states concerning the rights of black Americans were largely ignored. Ra-
cial status determinations involving citizens had yet to be formalized in 
either northern or southern states. So long as the disputes over the rights 
of blacks seemed to have only a minor impact on the society of the forum 
state, judges granted a great deal of comity to the laws and determinations 
of other states. Indeed, where popular ideologies did not forbid it, judges 
avoided interstate conflict whenever possible. Once states began to perce-
ive a threat in these laws and determinations, however, judges were no 
longer free to pretend that granting comity made no difference. 
Courts in the northern states were initially aided in their effort to 
avoid the question by the ambiguous state of slavery in that region. In 
1787, only one state, New Hampshire, explicitly prohibited slavery in its 
constitution;75 Massachusetts had apparently abolished slavery through a 
judicial interpretation of its constitution.76 Another three states, Connecti-
cut, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, had passed statutes providing for a 
gradual emancipation of all slaves in their territories. Still, slavery was 
hardly being extirpated from the northern states.77 Pennsylvania, one of 
the most antislavery states, is an instructive example.78 In 1783, Pennsyl-
vania adopted a statute for gradually abolishing slavery. Slaves then held 
within the state could be retained for the rest of their lives, and their child-
ren indentured until age 21—after that, the children would go free. The 
law prohibited any further importation of slaves, and provided for one of 
the strictest “sojourn laws” in the nation at the time—southern travelers 
could remain with their slaves within the state for no more than six months 
per visit, unless they were members of Congress.79
Northern state courts followed this legislative policy of showing little 
immediate concern for the freedom of blacks. In general, courts upheld 
the claims of southern slaveholders to their fugitive slaves or slaves held 
while traveling. The only exception to this policy was for slaveholders 
 75. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 1, § 1 (1783). 
 76. See FINKELMAN, supra note 5, at 41. Vermont also prohibited slavery in its constitution, but 
in 1787 was not yet part of the Union. See id.
 77. For recent historical accounts, see, e.g., DAVID N. GELLMAN, EMANCIPATING NEW YORK:
THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1777–1827 (2006); JOANNE POPE MELISH, DISOWNING 
SLAVERY: GRADUAL EMANCIPATION AND “RACE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780–1860 (1998). Even sla-
very’s status in the South was in some degree of flux. See EVA SHEPPARD WOLF, RACE AND LIBERTY 
IN THE NEW NATION: EMANCIPATION IN VIRGINIA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO NAT TURNER'S
REBELLION (2006). 
 78. See generally GARY B. NASH & JEAN R. SODERLUND, FREEDOM BY DEGREES:
EMANCIPATION IN PENNSYLVANIA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1991). 
 79. An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery § 10, 2 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 249–50 (M. Carey & J. Bioren eds., 1803). 
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who showed some inclination to reside permanently in a free state.80
Southern state courts likewise displayed a willingness to entertain claims 
that the laws of northern states had freed southern slaves.81 Southern 
courts, like northern courts, drew a distinction between masters who had 
brought slaves to northern states with an intention to reside there, and 
those who had only brought their slaves with them during visits to the 
North. Only in the former cases were slaves freed.82 Thus both southern 
and northern state courts, through the first decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, were operating under the same legal rules for slaves: masters could 
retain their slaves in any state in the union, so long as they did not manif-
est a permanent intention to reside in a free state.83 As much as possible, 
state courts attempted, through their slavery decisions, to draw the states 
together into one unified legal community. 
The cases existing before 1820 are either suits by slaves for freedom 
or contests of property devises. Free black travelers from northern states 
are notable by their absence from the judicial records. This was not be-
cause there were no northern free blacks visiting the South; black sailors, 
for instance, had been a fixture on northern ships since at least the eigh-
teenth century, and had been traveling through southern states with federal 
passes (given out to guard against impressment) since 1796.84 While these 
sailors no doubt met with legal problems in southern states, the transfera-
bility of their status as northern free citizens was not the subject of much 
litigation before 1820. 
The unifying clauses of the Constitution were, thus, not put to the test 
in the early years of the Republic. This was the result more of accidental 
alignment of state societies than because the national government was act-
ing to control their centrifugal tendencies. Federal law and federal authori-
ty were, in the early years, conceptually very distant from the problems of 
slavery and uniform citizenship rights. The federal government in these 
years maintained a shadowy existence over the states; there were few fed-
 80. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chambrè, 4 Dall. 143 (Pa. 1794) (holding French citizen dis-
lodged by revolt in Saint Domingo not entitled to hold slaves in Pennsylvania until finds new resi-
dence). 
 81. See Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820); Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 
(1824); Lunsford v. Coquillon, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 401 (La. 1824). 
 82. See Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) at 467. Virginia courts held only that a mere sojourn in a 
northern state was not enough to free a slave, without going so far as to hold that intent to reside 
would be sufficient. See Lewis v. Fullerton, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15 (1821). Louisiana courts adopted the 
French rule that any residence in a free state, no matter how brief, freed a slave. See Marie Louise v. 
Marot, 8 La. 475 (1835). 
 83. This was a rejection of what the common law rule of Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. 
Rep. 499 (K.B.), was believed to be: a slave became free as soon as he or she “breathed the air” of a 
free state. Only a few states, all of them in the South, showed any inclination to follow this rule before 
1830. See FINKELMAN, supra note 5, at 70. 
 84. See generally W. Jeffrey Bolster, “To Feel Like a Man”: Black Seamen in the Northern States, 
1800–1860, 76 J. AM. HIST. 1173 (1990). 
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eral laws and no enforcement agencies. Rarely did federal authority impact 
the life of the ordinary citizen. Federal courts met infrequently and in a 
sparse number of locations; blacks and slaveholders from a foreign juris-
diction were unlikely to be willing to wait around for the next session.85
Constitutional law was little studied and little reported; the common law, 
inherited from England, was believed to be the most important source of 
legal authority.86 The key document on the transferability of slave status 
through most of the antebellum period was thus not the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but the British 
case of Somerset v. Stewart.87
This began to change around 1820. At that time, questions of constitu-
tional law and the citizenship rights of blacks burst upon the national 
scene. The format for this discussion was the issue of admitting slave 
states from newly acquired territory—the debate over the admission of 
Missouri. The debate forced Congressmen to attempt to reconcile the in-
creasing need for a single national policy, encouraging or discouraging 
slavery, with the social order of each section. It proved to be impossible. 
B. Free Black Travelers 
For thirty years, Congress had little opportunity to engage in a divi-
sive debate over slavery. Since the states regulated most legal determina-
tions of status, the national government had little authority over such mat-
ters. Congress provided for the existence of slavery within the District of 
Columbia, and, after 1808, it prohibited the slave trade. In only a few 
areas did Congress even have indirect authority over slavery. One of these 
areas was in the admission of new states and territories.88 Still, no signifi-
cant controversies over the use of this authority occurred until 1820. Most 
states formed after the adoption of the Constitution had been admitted 
without much comment on their status as “slave” or “free” states. By 
1819, however, the question of whether a state was slave or free was as-
suming increasing ideological importance. The problem was not necessari-
ly that more people disliked slavery in 1819 than had in 1787; most nor-
therners, and perhaps many southerners, had always abstractly disap-
proved of the institution. Slavery was now assuming a place in the concep-
tual frameworks of Americans where its mere existence or non-existence 
 85. See FINKELMAN, supra note 5, at 238. 
 86. See Amar, supra note 13, at 1205; see also DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS,
1848–1861, at 52–53 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976). 
 87. 98 Eng. Rep. 499. For more about the Somerset case, see William M. Wiecek, Somerset:
Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 
(1974). 
 88. See Potter, supra note 86, at 53. 
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was being perceived as a threat, or an insult, or both.89 Issues surrounding 
slavery, such as the admission of new territories, or the rights of free 
blacks under the Constitution, began to assume increased importance as 
symbols of the social order that would govern the United States as a 
whole. Those symbols mattered more and more deeply to each side of the 
debate, as one side came to see slavery as a threat to the emerging work-
ers’ republic, and the other side came to see attempts to restrict slavery as 
attempts to destroy the basis for white equality. Congress finally entered 
the fray in 1820, in the debate over the admission of Missouri as a state. 
1. The Missouri Debate as a Status Regime Conflict 
The Missouri debate featured several hallmarks of what I am calling a 
status regime conflict—that is, an entrenched dispute between different 
segments of a larger polity over how to accord a given set of social status-
es. Four signals of such a conflict are present here. First, the Missouri 
debate involved an attempt to extend universally accepted general prin-
ciples—the rights of citizens and that “all men are created equal”—beyond 
their tacit boundaries.90 Second, the debate featured claims that alterations 
to the status regime would lead to an extremely slippery slope. Southern 
congressmen argued that a rule requiring respect for the rights of free 
black citizens would not only undermine the ability to draw racial classifi-
cations among travelers, but that it would undermine the ability to draw 
any status distinctions.91 Those arguing in favor of the extension of slavery 
and restrictions on free blacks claimed that their opponents’ reasoning 
would eliminate the justification for laws banning interracial marriage and 
the norms keeping blacks from being elected members of Congress.92 In 
what would be a frequent theme for antebellum defenders of the Southern 
status regime, Southern congressmen argued as a reductio ad absurdum
that distinctions between men and women would fall as well.93
 89. The reasons for this transformation are still not clear. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 69, at 23–
24. 
 90. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 338 (1820) (speech of Sen. Roberts) (quoting Declaration of Indepen-
dence). The response of southern legislators was to appeal to original intent. See id. at 301 (speech of 
Sen. Van Dyke) (explaining that intent of Declaration was only “that these united colonies are, and of 
right ought to be, free and independent States”); id. at 1004 (speech of Rep. Smyth) (limiting Declara-
tion of Independence to original intent); id. at 1071 (speech of Rep. Hardin) (same); id. at 350 (speech 
of Sen. Johnson) (“The meaning of th[e] sentence [was] that all communities stand upon an equality; 
that Americans are equal with Englishmen, and have the right to organize such government for them-
selves as they shall choose . . . .”); see also id. at 225 (speech of Sen. Macon) (arguing that the 
Founders would not have supported universal emancipation); id. at 325–26 (speech of Sen. Barbour) 
(same). 
 91. See id. at 309 (speech of Sen. Van Dyke). 
 92. See id. at 227 (speech of Sen. Macon); id. at 1154–55 (speech of Rep. McLane). 
 93. For example, Senator William Pinkney of Maryland asked antislavery northerners, if a repub-
lican government requires absolute equality of civil rights, then “why not all the women? . . . Why is 
it that their exclusion from the power of a popular Government is not destructive of its republican 
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A third hallmark of a status regime conflict is the perception that a 
challenge to a status regime represents an “insult.” A restriction against 
slavery imposed on Missouri, southern congressmen proclaimed, would be 
an intolerable insult to Missouri’s honor and integrity, as well as to that of 
the entire South. The restriction would “fix on Missouri the badge of in-
equality and degradation,” Senator James Barbour of Virginia proc-
laimed.94 It would separate the American people into “castes,” pure and 
impure, said another—not the obvious castes of slave and free, but the 
castes of those states that could choose to admit slavery and those that 
could not.95 Senator Barbour asked his northern colleagues: 
Can you bring your minds to believe that we shall sit quietly under 
this act of iniquity, as insulting as it is injurious? . . . [T]here is a 
point where submission becomes a crime, and resistance a vir-
tue. . . . Our people are as brave as they are loyal. They can en-
dure any thing but insult.96
The final hallmark of a status regime conflict follows from the first 
three. In response to such an insult, and the prospect of “anarchy” result-
ing from a loss of status determinations,97 extreme measures may be justi-
fied as “self-defense.” It was unlikely, southern congressmen claimed, 
that the framers of the Declaration of Independence had intended a wide 
application of the rights language of that document—that is, that they had 
intended to “dissolve the bonds of social order throughout the States . . . . 
Self-preservation—a regard for their own personal safety and that of their 
families, and a regard for the best interests of the nation—forbade those 
sages to do such an act.”98 In the end, the Congress was not able to agree 
on a single national rule on slavery. Instead, a “checkerboard solution”99
was arrived at: the Louisiana Purchase was arbitrarily divided, with sla-
very prohibited in one section and permitted in the other. 
character?” Id. at 413. 
 94. Id. at 104. 
 95. Id. at 89 (speech of Sen. Smith); see also id. at 93 (speech of Sen. Lloyd) (declaring question 
to be decided is whether “Maine and Missouri [should] be admitted into the Union on an equal footing 
with the original States”). 
 96. Id. at 328–29; see also id. at 175 (speech of Sen. Walker) (“I behold the father armed against 
the son, and the son against the father. I perceive a brother’s sword crimsoned with a brother’s blood. 
I perceive our houses wrapt in flames, and our wives and infant children driven from their homes, 
forced to submit to the pelting of the pitiless storm . . . with nothing to sustain them but the cold 
charity of an unfeeling world.”). 
 97. Id. at 968–69 (speech of Rep. Holmes). John Holmes of Massachusetts (and later Maine) was 
one of the few Northern congressmen who sided with the Southerners on the Missouri question. 
 98. Id. at 301–02 (speech of Sen. Van Dyke). 
 99. On checkerboard solutions, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 185–86 (1986) (“Integrity 
holds within political communities, not among them, so any opinion we have about the scope of the 
requirement of coherence makes assumptions about the size and character of these communities.”). 
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2. The Missouri Debate and the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
The most interesting feature of the Missouri debate came near its 
close. Shortly after the second session began, Missouri presented its new 
constitution to the Congress for approval. As its elected representatives sat 
in the wings, waiting to be seated, both houses furiously debated whether 
the constitution was in accord with the U.S. Constitution. At issue was 
Article III, Section 26 of the proposed constitution: “That it shall be the 
duty of the General Assembly of the State, as soon as may be, to pass such 
laws as may be necessary . . . to prevent free negroes and mulattoes from 
coming to and settling in this State, under any pretext whatsoever.”100
Northern congressmen claimed that the clause violated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause by abridging the privileges of black citizens of their 
states.101 Southern congressmen predictably reacted with horror and dis-
may at the suggestion that Missouri or any other state was obligated under 
the Constitution to recognize the privileges and immunities of black citi-
zens. “[I]f the policy imputed was really to be acted on,” Representative 
William Archer of Virginia stated, “every man must perceive that the Un-
ion was gone.”102
The prospect of nationalizing the rights of free blacks threatened the 
southern status hierarchies nearly as much as adopting a national principle 
hostile to slavery would have. By 1820, southern societies, and the indi-
viduals that comprised them, were increasingly being defined according to 
racial castes.103 The keys to the development of such a system were the 
assignation of low status to free blacks as well as slaves and the punish-
ment of any blacks who exceeded the role assigned to them.104 Such pu-
nishments would be informal where possible, but were reinforced with 
laws where enforcement was difficult. A national legal rule forbidding 
formal discriminatory sanctions against free blacks from other states 
would trump the local social order, however. The application of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause to northern blacks meant that they could 
bring the social and legal status accorded them in other states with them as 
they traveled in southern states. Southern communities would be unable to 
follow the law of the national community and to apply their social judg-
ments; either the law or the judgments would have to go. Following a na-
tional rule of according equal status to black travelers would therefore 
100. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 47 (1820) (speech of Sen. Burrill) (quoting proposed Missouri constitu-
tion). 
101. See id.
102. Id. at 595. 
103. See JORDAN, supra note 70, at 403–26.
104. Although showing its age, the classic survey of the lives of free blacks in the antebellum South 
remains IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH
(1974). 
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have meant the destruction of southern societies. Free black citizens were 
mobile nuclear warheads to the southern social order. 
Faced with this threat, southern politicians protested vehemently 
against the idea that the Missouri constitution violated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. To admit otherwise would be to “place all the States at 
the mercy of a dissolute, heterogeneous population of any one” state.105
Once the states developed inconsistent social orders, which they had, the 
unifying clauses of Article IV, read broadly, forced states to accept human 
time bombs within their communities: persons who, by their very pres-
ence, could suddenly and radically reorganize the social order.106 Objec-
tions to the broad reading of Article IV were rife with the language of 
compulsion: “If it was the wish of any of the States to have colored citi-
zens, [Rep. William S. Archer of Virginia] said, that he felt neither wish 
or authority to derogate from their right to do so. The proposition he de-
nied was, that such citizens could be imposed on other States, who had no 
participation in the wish.”107
The threat that free black citizens posed in a society based on a racial 
caste system was that they were what Ruth Colker has called “hybrids,” 
persons who did not easily fit any extant niche in the existing social hie-
rarchy.108 As with all hybrids, either they would have to be made to fit, or 
the hierarchy would have to be changed to accommodate the new social 
reality. The threat that they posed was apparent in the responses of South-
ern congressmen: “We in the Southern States,” Representative Philip P. 
Barbour of Virginia declared, 
consider this description of population the most dangerous to the 
community that can possibly be conceived. They are just enough 
elevated to have some sense of liberty, and yet not the capacity to 
estimate or enjoy all its rights, if they had them—and being be-
tween two societies, above one and below the other, they are in 
the most dissatisfied state.109
105. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 622 (1820) (speech of Rep. McLane). 
106. These persons could reorganize the social order suddenly and radically, but not necessarily 
immediately. Such individuals posed a threat as long as they went unchecked; but of course, a com-
munity could go through many ideological gymnastics in order to justify enforcing important local 
status rules. Only outside intervention, or serious internal doubts about the existing status hierarchy, 
would bring it down without a fight. 
107. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 584 (1820); see also id. at 84 (speech of Sen. Holmes) (“forced, 
against our will”); id. at 550 (speech of Rep. Barbour) (“no power to refuse”); id. at 558 (speech of 
Rep. Smyth) (state will have “no authority to exclude some persons dangerous to her peace and happi-
ness”); id. at 626 (speech of Rep. McLane) (Missouri will be “compel[led] . . . to receive a popula-
tion which cannot assimilate with her citizens”). 
108. See COLKER, supra note 67, at xii.
109. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 549 (1820). 
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In a revealing analogy, Alexander Smyth of Virginia compared free 
blacks to lepers. Suppose, he asked, an outbreak occurred in Philadelphia, 
and 10,000 people were infected: “would the corporation of Philadelphia, 
or the Legislature of Pennsylvania, have a right to send those lepers into 
Delaware; and would they have a right of ‘settling’ there, as one of the 
privileges of citizens of the United States, against the will of the govern-
ment of Delaware?”110 No, Smyth concluded; the “right of self-
preservation” precluded such a result.111 If lepers could not settle in Dela-
ware, then neither could free blacks enter Missouri, for they too were 
“dangerous to [the] peace.”112 No state could be forced to receive citizens 
it did not want, Southerners argued. Only Congress could make “citizens 
in the General Government,” and then only through the power of naturali-
zation.113 As regarded native-born persons, Southern spokesmen con-
cluded, each state retained the right to determine for itself who could re-
side in its territory and who could receive the rights of citizenship there.114
Northerners turned this argument right back around, however. If each 
state had the right to determine which of its inhabitants were its own citi-
zens, then no other state could interfere with that determination by “dis-
franchis[ing]” those citizens when they traveled.115 To hold any less would 
be to obliterate the federal union and replace it with the old confederation 
of sovereign republics. Each state could determine its own citizens accord-
ing to its own interests, and “[w]hatever inconveniences may be supposed 
to result from . . . this power, in relation to the other States, must be at-
tributed therefore to that principle of our Union, without which our Na-
tional Government would retain as little perhaps of permanency as utili-
ty.”116 Furthermore, Northerners argued, while traitors or carriers of dis-
ease could be forbidden from entering a state, black citizens could not be 
excluded merely because they were black. Individual citizens could be 
excluded only after a legal determination of their harmfulness, but such a 
judgment could not be generalized to include an entire group.117 The 
110. Id. at 558. 
111. Id. at 557. The “right of self-preservation” was traditionally invoked not only by Southerners 
wishing to defend the racial caste system, but by vigilante groups seeking to justify extralegal violence 
against persons violating their social role. See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE:
HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 115–16 (1975). In such contexts, it 
appears that “self-preservation” refers to social rather than physical self-preservation.  
112. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 558 (1820). 
113. Id. at 623 (speech of Rep. McLane). 
114. See id. at 549 (speech of Rep. Barbour); id. at 580 (speech of Rep. Archer). 
115. Id. at 629–30 (speech of Rep. Mallary). 
116. Id. at 537 (speech of Rep. Storrs); see also id. at 48 (speech of Sen. Burrill). More recently, 
Max Radin has said much the same thing: “That a state policy on moral as well as economic issues is 
subject to this qualified frustration is, it has been well said, one of the prices we pay for the mainten-
ance of our Federal system.” Max Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History,
39 ILL. L. REV. 1, 29, 32 (1944). 
117. See 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 601 (1820) (speech of Rep. Hemphill); see also id. at 566 (speech 
of Rep. Strong). 
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Northern social order simply did not require the same color barrier that 
the Southern order did. 
As with the debate over slavery, the debate over the rights of black 
citizens was not easily resolved by reference to the intentions of the 
founders. The framers of the Constitution had obviously intended that the 
states be bound closer together; their attention was focused on the problem 
of discrimination against worthy citizens of another state (i.e., men like 
themselves) as they traveled, not the problem of one state declaring native-
born persons to be citizens that other states would regard as harmful. They 
had some dim awareness that there might be problems with too much un-
iformity;118 a balance would have to be struck between the too-loose con-
federation of the Articles and a single national community where the states 
became vestigial. The framers did not articulate exactly where this balance 
should lie, however. They seem to have presumed continued harmony 
over the question of who the citizens of each state were. 
The ideology of the founding generation was clear, however, that the 
(legal) status of “citizenship” allowed no gradations: persons were either 
citizens, or they were not. During the controversy with Britain surround-
ing the Revolution, a new ideology of citizenship was developed in Amer-
ica, one that replaced older notions of subjectship and allegiance with no-
tions of contract and consent: the people, not the government, were the 
basis of all authority.119 This implied that one could choose which country 
one belonged to, and once that choice had been made, one was an equal 
part of the sovereign; there were no “estates” in America. This ideology 
had obvious use in a situation where colonists wanted to reject their old 
government as having usurped its authority and to choose to become an 
independent nation; however, it also removed the legal basis for distin-
guishing between different grades of citizens. Social hierarchies would 
from then on have to be enforced informally or through Ptolemaic excep-
tions to the principle of uniform citizenship. 
Southern congressmen once again argued that the national political 
culture, as it had been handed down from the Revolutionary generation, 
should be interpreted in light of the specific context in which it was origi-
nally formed. Although the framers had specified no particular principles 
concerning the rights of free blacks, supporters of the Southern social or-
ders felt justified in assuming what those principles might have been had 
118. Increased uniformity, the framers realized, would have made the old Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of the Articles particularly troublesome, since it gave the “inhabitants” of one state the 
privileges of “citizens” in another. See ARTS. CONFED. art. IV (1777). The language was changed so 
that states would have to recognize inhabitants as citizens in their own territory before they could be 
vested with the rights of citizenship elsewhere. It seems not to have occurred to them that even this 
could be deeply problematic, if notions of who should be a citizen diverged in the several states. 
119. For an excellent history of the changing conception of citizenship in the colonies and early 
American republic, see KETTNER, supra note 44. 
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the framers been asked. The Constitution, Senator John Holmes of Maine 
observed, provided that any citizen of a certain age and born in the coun-
try could be elected to federal office.120 “That the framers of the Constitu-
tion intended that blacks and mulattoes might be members of Congress or 
Presidents,” Holmes exclaimed, “is a supposition too absurd to be for a 
moment entertained.”121 The Constitution was framed by an “association 
. . . of white people—Europeans and their descendants,”122 with “a view 
to the liberty and rights of white men.”123 The protections of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause were only intended for whites. Representative 
Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina, a delegate at the Philadelphia 
Convention, rose from his seat late in the debate to confirm this view. 
After claiming that he wrote the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Pinck-
ney explained, “[A]t the time I drew that constitution, I perfectly knew 
that there did not then exist such a thing in the Union as a black or colored 
citizen, nor could I then have conceived it possible such a thing could ever 
have existed in it . . . .”124 Southerners thus appealed to the “passive in-
tentions” of the framers to argue that, when it came to their statements of 
principles, “[b]road as they appear, every one knows they were li-
mited.”125
As with the Declaration of Independence, however, constitutional 
principles had gotten more general as they had gotten older. Interpreted 
strictly, the Constitution did not bar anyone from its protection on the ba-
sis of color; Northern congressmen therefore argued that the “passive in-
tentions” of the framers worked in exactly the opposite way Southerners 
had intended. “To justify the inference of gentlemen,” Rep. William Eus-
tis of Massachusetts complained, “the preamble ought to read, We the 
white people.”126 Eustis claimed such a phrase never would have been as-
sented to by delegates “from the Middle and Northern States,” who knew 
that thousands of free blacks lived in their states.127 Other congressmen 
pointed out that black soldiers had served in the Revolutionary War.128
The key argument was over who determined what rights Northern 
black citizens would receive. Southerners argued that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause did not allow blacks to carry their status determinations 
with them as they traveled. Free blacks, under this theory, were entitled 
only the privileges that free blacks had at their destination, not to the pri-
120. See 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 85–86 (1820).
121. Id. at 86. 
122. Id. at 616 (speech of Rep. McLane).  
123. Id. at 550 (speech of Rep. Barbour). 
124. Id. at 1134 (1821). 
125. Id. at 618 (1820) (speech of Rep. McLane). 
126. Id. at 636–37. 
127. Id. at 637. 
128. See, e.g., id. at 572 (speech of Rep. Strong); id. at 598 (speech of Rep. Hemphill). 
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vileges of all citizens.129 The intention of the Clause was only to prevent 
discrimination based on state origin;130 otherwise, the state’s ability to re-
gulate status would be obliterated. Representative William Archer of Vir-
ginia brought this home with a hypothetical: Suppose women were, in one 
of the states, “admitted to all the privileges of citizenship,” including suf-
frage.131 Under the Northerners’ theory, Archer contended, women would, 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, be able to bring their status as 
voters with them as they traveled to a new state.132 Archer believed his 
hypothetical made his point: “Constructions of this kind were no subjects 
for discussion.”133 Citizens traveling from state to state could not gain 
more privileges in new states than “indigenous inhabitants of the same 
class and description,” and certainly could not gain more rights than they 
had had at home.134 Otherwise, incompatible social systems would come 
into irresolvable conflict. 
Northerners protested that such an interpretation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause placed Northern and Southern societies too far apart. If 
every state could place restrictions on any persons they considered “odious 
and pernicious” without control from some national rule, then anyone 
could be barred from traveling, whether on account of color, size, or pro-
fession.135 Each state would essentially “become a distinct nation of 
people, of peculiar habits, of separate interests, and singular character. 
Not only the laws, but the passions of the people of each State would soon 
be in martial array against one another.”136 In other words, the incompati-
bility between the states’ societies would only get worse if Article IV were 
to be interpreted as loosely as Southerners were proposing. Black citizens 
had to travel with their Northern status judgments intact in order to keep 
the Union on an even keel.137
At the end of the debate over Missouri, Northern and Southern con-
gressmen were unable to resolve their differences and agree on a single 
national rule with respect to black citizenship. The most they could agree 
on was to require Missouri to pass a resolution that the controversial pro-
vision in its constitution would not be interpreted to authorize any law “by 
which any citizen of either of the States of this Union shall be excluded 
from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such 
129. See id. at 87 (speech of Sen. Holmes). Put differently, if the public policy of the destination 
state was to restrict black freedom, then such a policy could override the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. 
130. See id. at 581–82 (speech of Rep. Archer). 
131. Id. at 582. 
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also id. at 622 (speech of Rep. McLane). 
135. Id. at 634–35 (speech of Rep. Mallary). 
136. Id. at 989 (1821) (speech of Rep. Butler). 
137. See id. at 533–36 (1820) (speech of Rep. Storrs); id. at 571 (speech of Rep. Strong). 
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citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the United States,” whatever 
those were.138 Determinations of social status depend for their strength on 
the support of the underlying culture. If that culture only weakly or ambi-
valently supports certain status determinations, those determinations are 
objectively completely arbitrary. That is, they will depend on continued 
voluntary support from members of the community; force of logic alone 
will not compel members to support the rules. The voluntary support for 
agreement over the status of blacks in America was fast disappearing by 
1821. 
3. Negro Seamen Acts  
The divergence between the states that was apparent in Congress soon 
affected the courts, both federal and state. In the wake of the Missouri 
debate of 1820–21, Southern states began passing laws or handing down 
court decisions that restricted the rights of free blacks. The inability to 
decide on a political rule at the national level soon became more general 
and more entrenched; the states could not agree on a single legal rule ei-
ther. Yet their situation increasingly demanded one. Southerners traveled 
with their slaves into Northern states, sometimes for long periods of time; 
Northern blacks traveled to Southern ports on merchant ships; Southerners 
claimed that blacks living in the North were fugitive slaves. Remaining 
one community required adopting a rule that would accord with the social 
systems of every state. When this proved to be impossible, courts began 
interpreting the laws of other states as purposefully trying to overthrow 
their social and legal orders. Civil war was not far behind. 
Several states, following South Carolina’s lead, passed laws restricting 
free black seamen after Denmark Vesey’s planned rebellion was discov-
ered in 1822.139 South Carolina’s “act for the better regulation of free ne-
groes and persons of color,” passed in 1822, provided that any blacks 
arriving on board a ship would be “seized and confined in gaol until such 
vessel shall clear out and depart from this state”; if the captain of the ves-
sel did not pay the costs of confinement, the prisoners could be sold into 
slavery.140 It did not take long for the law to wind up in federal court, in 
138. Id. at 1785 (quoting Presidential Proclamation of Aug. 10, 1821). Hamburger suggests that 
the South got the better part of this compromise. See Hamburger, supra note 32, at 24 n.67. 
139. See Bolster, supra note 84, at 1192–93. Vesey himself was a former sailor who evidently 
drew from Charleston’s maritime community in organizing his conspiracy. See W. JEFFREY BOLSTER,
BLACK JACKS: AFRICAN AMERICAN SEAMEN IN THE AGE OF SAIL 193–94 (1997). There is some 
controversy over whether Vesey’s conspiracy was real. Compare Michael P. Johnson, Denmark Vesey 
and His Co-Conspirators, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 915 (2001) (conspiracy was fabricated), with Robert 
L. Paquette, From Rebellion to Revisionism: The Continuing Debate About the Denmark Vesey Affair,
4 J. HIST. SOC'Y 291 (2004) (conspiracy existed). 
140. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 493 (D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366). 
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the case of Elkison v. Deliesseline.141 The plaintiff in Deliesseline was a 
British seaman who had been imprisoned by Charleston’s sheriff under the 
law; Justice Johnson therefore avoided the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause altogether and found that the law was unconstitutional because it 
conflicted with Congress’s power to regulate commerce and make trea-
ties.142
As interesting as the holding, however, was the defense of the law. 
The attorney general of South Carolina did not argue the case in defense 
of the law; in fact, the state itself seemed to have removed itself from its 
enforcement.143 Rather, as Johnson noted, “prosecutions under this act 
were discontinued, until lately revived by a voluntary association of gen-
tlemen, who have organized themselves into a society to see the laws car-
ried into effect.”144 Such a “voluntary association” might have been called, 
in later years, a “Vigilance Committee”: a group of local elites seeking to 
maintain the current social order through extralegal means.145 The repre-
sentatives of the voluntary association argued that it if the Act contradicted 
the Constitution, so much the worse for the Constitution.146 The right to 
control free blacks was “a right of vital importance” to the sovereignty of 
the state, one that could not have been yielded to the national govern-
ment.147
The association’s fear of free black seamen was understandable. Serv-
ing on board a merchant ship, whaler, or warship was an unparalleled 
opportunity for Northern free blacks, who signed up in Northern ports in 
disproportionately high numbers.148 Ships’ crews had traditionally been 
drawn from the “mob” of poor urban dwellers; once on board, race mat-
tered less than ability and length of service.149 Ships therefore had a rela-
tively egalitarian culture that tended to wash out shoreside racist norms.150
141. See id.
142. See id. at 495. United States Attorney General William Wirt came to the same conclusion the 
following year. See Validity of the South Carolina Police Bill, 1 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 659 (1824). 
South Carolina, however, refused to acquiesce in the decision, and the Negro Seamen Acts continued 
to be a diplomatic embarrassment for the United States for decades. See Philip M. Hamer, Great 
Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822–1848, 1 J. S. HIST. 3 (1935). 
143. See Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 494. 
144. Id. The group in question called itself the South Carolina Association. See Alan F. January, 
The South Carolina Association: An Agency for Race Control in Antebellum Charleston, 78 S.C. HIST.
MAG. 191 (1977). 
145. See generally BROWN, supra note 109, at 95–143. Compare enforcement of the Negro Seamen 
Act with enforcement of the laws, spurred by private factions, in New Mexico or Arizona later in the 
century. See ROBERT M. UTLEY, HIGH NOON IN LINCOLN: VIOLENCE ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER 
(1987); PAULA MITCHELL MARKS, “AND DIE IN THE WEST”: THE STORY OF THE O.K. CORRAL
GUNFIGHT (Simon & Schuster 1990) (1989); LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN 
ABDUCTION (1999). 
146. See January, supra note 144, at 196. 
147. Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 494. 
148. See Bolster, supra note 83, at 1176 tbl.1. 
149. Id. at 1174. 
150. See id. at 1178. 
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Worse still, from the point of view of Southern societies, blacks could 
attain high ranks on board a ship, including authority over white crew 
members.151 The opportunities for high status on board a ship made free 
black crew members dangerous indeed to Southern societies. 
Over the next twenty years, similar laws were enacted in North Caro-
lina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana.152 Louisiana’s law, 
passed in 1842, spurred black Bostonians to petition their government to 
look into the matter.153 In 1843, at the urging of Massachusetts Represent-
atives, the House Commerce Committee looked into the matter and pro-
duced a report declaring the Seamen’s Acts unconstitutional under the Pri-
vileges and Immunities Clause.154 In 1844, the Massachusetts legislature 
authorized the governor to appoint two delegates to go to New Orleans 
and Charleston and collect information about Massachusetts citizens being 
detained with an eye toward challenging the practice in federal court.155
The governor appointed Samuel Hoar to go to Charleston, and Henry 
Hubbard to New Orleans.156 Both delegates were forced to leave those 
cities, however, under threat of mob violence.157 Indeed, the South Caroli-
na legislature ordered Hoar’s expulsion within days of his arrival, and he 
barely escaped being lynched.158 Hoar’s treatment, in particular, caused an 
uproar in Massachusetts on his return.159
The treatment of Northern black sailors in Southern ports continued to 
be a cause célèbre throughout the remainder of the antebellum period. For 
example, much like Missouri’s restriction on free blacks three decades 
earlier, Southern restrictions on sailors became a coda to the heated debate 
over the Compromise of 1850. If the North was going to be forced to rec-
ognize the status of slavery in its territory through the operation of the 
Fugitive Slave Clause,160 Senator Robert Winthrop of Massachusetts ar-
gued, then shouldn’t South Carolina be obligated to recognize the privileg-
151. See id. at 1180. 
152. See id. at 1192. 
153. See id. at 1193. 
154. THE IMPRISONMENT OF FREE COLORED SEAMEN, H.R. REP. NO. 27-80 (1843), reprinted in
ROBERT C. WINTHROP, ADDRESSES AND SPEECHES ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS 341, 343 (1852) (“The 
committee have no hesitation in agreeing with the memorialists, that the acts of which they complain, 
are violations of the privileges of citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.”). 
155. See Hamer, supra note 142, at 22. 
156. See id. at 22–23.  
157. See id.
158. See 1 HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT: A HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1860–’65, at 180–85 (1877). 
159. See Hamer, supra note 142 at 22–23. Although Hoar’s mission was to investigate the mal-
treatment of black Massachusetts, no doubt part of the explanation for the reaction to his own treat-
ment is explained by shock that a white Massachusetts citizen would be treated with similar disrespect. 
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom 
such Service or Labour may be due.”). 
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es and immunities of black Massachusetts citizens?161 The arguments had 
not changed in thirty years.162 Defenders of the Seamen’s Acts responded 
that blacks were not citizens since they were deprived of certain rights in 
Massachusetts and everywhere else; or, even if they were citizens, their 
citizenship status could not travel with them: “I insist, sir, that they have 
no right to make a black man a citizen in Massachusetts and send him to 
South Carolina . . . .”163 Northerners objected, as before, that the Consti-
tution made no distinction between citizens and that neither could Southern 
states. 
What had changed was that the threat to Southern institutions had ap-
parently increased greatly since 1820. Southern congressmen defended the 
Seaman’s Acts as police regulations which were necessary to prevent mur-
der and other horrid crimes. Even questioning the acts in Congress was 
tantamount to declaring “a war upon southern safety.”164 With their status 
as slaveholders and as whites in a racial caste system, Southern congress-
men became very attentive to the symbols of status in the national gov-
ernment. Their status was being challenged daily, and it did not seem they 
could effectively punish the challengers. The longer this continued, the 
more it hurt the Southern social order’s claim to rule in the relevant com-
munity. Senator John Berrien of Georgia finally exasperatedly declared,  
[I]f this incessant war is to be kept up de die in diem; if it is to be 
arrayed against our institutions; if we are within this Hall and 
elsewhere to be constantly denounced and assailed by remarks cal-
culated to wound and irritate the feelings of slaveholders; . . . 
[then] you are forcing upon us the conviction . . . that we cannot 
much longer be considered fit associates for the people of the non-
slaveholding States.165
These conflicts over the privileges and immunities of Northern black 
citizens were a crucial part of the antebellum history that the Radical Re-
publicans had in mind as they debated the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
Reconstruction Congress. The restrictions on black travelers imposed by 
Missouri and, later, Oregon, as well as the Seaman’s Acts, including most 
161. See CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS. app. at 1655 (1850). 
162. Indeed, some would be recycled. Serving as U.S. Attorney General in 1832, Roger Taney 
drafted an opinion defending South Carolina’s Negro Seamen Act on grounds similar to those he 
would use 35 years later in his opinion in Dred Scott: that blacks could not be citizens and therefore 
were not entitled to the protections of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See H. Jefferson Powell, 
Attorney General Taney & the South Carolina Police Bill, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 75, 101 (2001), available 
at http:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm? abstract_id=824906. 
163. CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS. app. at 1654 (speech of Sen. Butler); see also id. app. 
at 1659 (speech of Sen. Soule). 
164. Id. app. at 1662 (speech of Sen. Berrien). 
165. Id.
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prominently the Hoar expedition, were cited repeatedly by Republican 
congressmen.166 The goal, then, was to resolve once and for all the fede-
ralist stalemate that had emerged in the antebellum period. 
C. The Rights of Alleged Fugitive Slaves 
Free black travelers were not the only residents of Northern states put 
in jeopardy by Southern status regimes. Another significant issue that in-
creasingly divided Northern and Southern states was the ease or difficulty 
of identifying and recapturing fugitive slaves. Article IV of the Constitu-
tion specifically provided for an obligation on the part of states to assist 
residents of other states in returning fugitive slaves. But like the other 
provisions of Article IV, no mechanism was identified to achieve this 
goal. Southern slaveowners took to simply capturing those they believed to 
be slaves and returning them to slavery. The situation presented a conun-
drum: if the person really was a slave, then he or she had no legal rights 
that needed to be respected. But if he or she was not, then that person was 
a state resident deserving of legal process. 
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was passed in an effort to mitigate this 
conflict.167 It empowered slaveowners or their agents to seize fugitive 
slaves anywhere in the country and prohibited interference with them. It 
also provided a procedure by which the slaveowner could appear before a 
state or federal judge or magistrate and prove ownership.168 However, 
there was no penalty for failing to do so, and in fact the procedural re-
quirement was often ignored. 
The failure to provide for the protection of Northern black residents 
became a significant issue by the 1830s. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a Pennsylvania law that made it a crime to re-
move blacks from the state without taking them before a state judge for a 
hearing.169 Such a law, the Prigg Court held, interfered with slaveholders’ 
rights under the Fugitive Slave Clause: slaveholders had the right of “re-
caption” and could take their escaped slaves wherever they might find 
them without answering to any court.170 The Prigg decision seemed to hold 
that only the federal government could enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause; 
states were not to interfere.171 Several Northern states interpreted Prigg to 
166. See Amar, supra note 13, at 1277 & n.357. Even a decade later, the Hoar expedition was 
cited prominently in accounts of the causes of the Civil War. See GREELEY, supra note 158, at 178–
85; 1 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 578–86 
(1872). 
167. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302 (1793). 
168. See id.
169. See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 543 (1842). 
170. Id. at 579. 
171. The actual holding was far from clear; Northern states interpreted the decision this way, 
however. See Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Uses of 
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mean that they had no obligation to enforce the clause, either, and passed 
“personal liberty laws,” prohibiting state officials from aiding in the re-
capture of slaves.172 At a time when the federal government barely existed 
outside of Washington, D.C., this was a serious impediment to enforce-
ment of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. 
In 1850, after the conclusion of the Mexican–American War, yet 
another prolonged debate erupted in Congress over the status of slavery in 
the newly acquired territories. This debate was even more vituperous than 
the 1820 debate over Missouri.173 Eventually, another compromise was 
reached: California was admitted as a free state; New Mexico was added 
as a territory with no restrictions on slavery; New Mexico’s boundary 
with Texas was settled; the District of Columbia retained slavery but ab-
olished the slave trade; and a new Fugitive Slave Act was passed. The 
“compromise” was not a true compromise, however. Again, no governing 
national principles were agreed to; even the compromise itself was not 
passed as one package, but as individual pieces, supported by one section 
or another and a small corps of swing voters.174
The new Act attempted to ease the difficulties by providing for a large 
number of federal commissioners throughout the states whose sole duty 
was to make a preliminary finding on the claims of slaveholders to their 
alleged slaves.175 Just to make sure they decided the right way, the com-
missioners were to be paid ten dollars if they found for the master, but 
only five if they denied the claim.176 As several Northern congressmen 
pointed out, however, such a system presumed that a claimed person was 
an escaped slave and not a citizen entitled to a full-blown trial before his 
or her rights could be restricted.177 Southerners claimed that extensive pro-
cedural safeguards would render the Fugitive Slave Clause nugatory in the 
face of Northern resistance.178 The Act that finally passed had no provision 
for any formal trials.179
a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIVIL WAR HIST. 5, 9 (1979). 
172. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE 
NORTH, 1780–1861 (1974). 
173. The debate lasted through four sessions of Congress and sparked many side issues. It took the 
House of Representatives six weeks to decide on a speaker; one week was spent debating the election 
of the doorkeeper and his views on slavery. See CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS. app. at 396 
(1850) (speech of Rep. Ashmun); id. at 115–16 (speech of Sen. Clay). 
174. See POTTER, supra note 86, at 113. Potter calls the Compromise of 1850 “a truce perhaps, an 
armistice, certainly a settlement, but not a true compromise.” Id. In being decided by a small group of 
swing voters, the Compromise was as much a unified decision as Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
175. See POTTER, supra note 86, at 131–34. 
176. See id. at 134. 
177. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 524 (speech of Sen. Hale). 
178. See, e.g., id. app. at 630–31 (speech of Sen. Soule). 
179. POTTER, supra note 86, at 134; see generally STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE 
CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850–1860 (1970). 
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The new Fugitive Slave Act hardly resolved the issue, however, and 
only drew the federal government deeper into the conflict. By 1850, 
Northern and Southern states alike were becoming increasingly recalci-
trant. A notable example of the Northern reaction to the Fugitive Slave 
Act occurred in the case of Ableman v. Booth.180 Ableman arose from the 
efforts of a Missouri slaveowner to recapture a fugitive slave in Wiscon-
sin.181 The owner’s agents found the former slave in Racine, Wisconsin, 
and apprehended him. Before they could present him to a federal magi-
strate in Milwaukee, however, a mob stormed the jail and freed him. The 
U.S. Attorney then arrested and prosecuted a leader of the mob, Sherman 
Booth. The Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, dec-
laring the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional and ordering the U.S. Mar-
shal to free Booth. Ableman, the Marshal, petitioned for a writ of certi-
orari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which it granted—and which the Wis-
consin Supreme Court ignored. The Wisconsin Supreme Court simply 
refused to certify the record.182 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually heard 
the case, and held that a state court cannot intervene in a federal prosecu-
tion by issuing a writ of habeas corpus to a federal officer.183 But the Wis-
consin Supreme Court ignored that order as well and refused to retract its 
decision. 
D. The Breakdown of Comity 
As the case of Ableman v. Booth illustrates, by 1859, the rule of law 
was disintegrating in the United States. One of the essential features of a 
federal government is the principle of “comity”—the amount of respect 
one jurisdiction pays to the laws of another.184 Comity is possible in a he-
terogeneous, but consistent, legal system. That is, it is possible in a sys-
tem where the differences that exist do not matter greatly. Then it is poss-
ible to hold, with Stephen Douglas, that “‘[i]t is neither desirable nor 
possible . . . that there should be uniformity in the local institutions and 
domestic regulations of the different states of this Union. . . . Diversity, 
dissimilarity, variety in all our local and domestic institutions is the great 
safeguard of our liberties.’”185 Such toleration of difference in the social 
180. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
181. For recent accounts, see H. ROBERT BAKER, THE RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A FUGITIVE 
SLAVE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (2007); Jeffrey Schmitt, Rethinking 
Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93 VA. L. REV. 1315 (2007). 
182. Although it has come to mean simply granting leave to appeal, a writ of certiorari is technical-
ly an order to a lower court to send the record in the case to the Supreme Court. See “certiorari,” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 241–42 (8th ed. 2004). 
183. Ableman, 62 U.S. at 523–24. 
184. For an excellent history of the decline of antebellum comity, see generally FINKELMAN, supra
note 76. 
185. POTTER, supra note 86, at 341 (quoting Stephen Douglas, speech at Chicago, July 9, 1858). 
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orders of the various states was possible so long as those differences were 
compatible; that is, where the perception of difference did not seem to 
threaten the very existence of the social order in another state. Perceptions 
slowly began to change in the North and South in response to the econom-
ic and social changes described above. 
The breakdown in comity began in the 1820s, after the Missouri de-
bate. The same year the South Carolina Negro Seamen Act was passed, 
Kentucky adopted the Southern position on free blacks into its common 
law. In 1822, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided the case of Amy 
v. Smith,186 in which a slave, Amy, sued for her freedom, claiming she 
had been freed under the laws of Pennsylvania or Virginia several years 
previously. The defendant responded that Amy was barred from making a 
claim under those laws by an act of the Kentucky legislature prohibiting all 
such claims from being made after 1810. Amy claimed this violated her 
privileges and immunities as a citizen of either Pennsylvania or Virginia. 
The court drew a distinction between citizens and “subjects”: citizens, it 
held, were only those native-born persons who were entitled to “all the 
rights and privileges conferred . . . upon the highest class of society.”187
As for the obvious objection that white women and children did not hold 
these rights, yet were still citizens, the court claimed that women and 
children “partake of the quality of those adult males who belong to the 
same class and condition in society.”188 The court simply ignored the dis-
sent’s observation that not all white men had all the rights and privileges 
of the “highest class of society.”189
If Southern courts were adopting the argument expressed by Southern-
ers in the Missouri debates, Northern courts eventually began adopting the 
other side. That is, in a series of decisions following Commonwealth v. 
Aves,190 Northern courts began removing all the support they could from 
the institution of slavery. Aves involved a twelve-year-old girl named 
Med, who was brought to Boston from Louisiana by her owner for a stay 
of several months. The question was whether Med could be held as a slave 
during her stay in Massachusetts, which had no law recognizing slavery. 
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, deciding the case, phrased the question care-
fully: it was not whether entering the state “works any alteration in [the 
slave’s] status, or condition, as settled by the law of his domicil”; it was, 
rather, whether there was “authority on the part of the master, either to 
restrain the slave of his liberty, whilst here, or forcibly to take him into 
186. 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822). (Until 1976, the Court of Appeals was Kentucky’s highest appel-
late court.) 
187. Id. at 333. 
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). 
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custody in order to [effect] his removal.”191 Shaw decided that there was 
no such authority under Massachusetts law: while other states were free to 
adopt laws that placed some persons in the state of slavery, the laws of 
Massachusetts would not support the enforcement of those laws by permit-
ting the forcible detention or removal of a slave brought to that state.192
Although in general states owed comity to each other’s laws, the enforce-
ment of Louisiana’s slavery laws, Shaw declared, would not be consistent 
with the social order of Massachusetts: “[S]uch an application of the law 
would be wholly repugnant to our laws, entirely inconsistent with our pol-
icy and our fundamental principles, and is therefore inadmissible.”193
Reaction to Aves in the South was harsh—one Southern newspaper 
called it an “‘outrage upon Southern Rights.’”194 Nevertheless, by 1845, 
almost every Northern state had adopted Aves as its law.195 Southern 
courts responded in kind, holding that the laws of Northern states could 
not free Southern slaves. For example, dismissing a claim that travel to 
Ohio had instantly emancipated a slave, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
held that if the laws of Ohio had worked such an emancipation, Kentucky 
had no obligation to respect the laws of a state that had paid “so little re-
spect” to Kentucky’s own status-enforcing laws.196 Similarly, reviewing an 
emancipation of a slave performed in Ohio, the Mississippi High Court of 
Errors and Appeals rejected its validity, holding that “[n]o state is bound 
to recognise or enforce a contract made elsewhere, which would injure the 
state or its citizens; or which would exhibit to the citizens an example per-
nicious and detestable.”197 The laws of Ohio were thus entitled to no defe-
rence on the matter; to do so would be to allow Mississippi citizens to 
“defraud[ ]” the laws “of their operation.”198
Although Southern states were thus taking steps to remove the badges 
of status from Northern free blacks traveling to their states, and Northern 
states began removing the support of their laws from the enforcement of 
Southern slave status, state courts had yet to hold that the laws of other 
states were by themselves threatening to their societies. The Northern 
states were putting into law what had only been expressed in debate in 
191. Id. at 208. 
192. See id. at 215, 217. 
193. Id. at 218. Interestingly, the lawyers in Aves only debated the principles of international comi-
ty, Somerset, and the Fugitive Slave Clause; no one seems to have considered either the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This allowed Shaw to announce, “The consti-
tution and laws of the United States, then, are confined to cases of slaves escaping from other States 
and coming within the limits of this State without the consent and against the will of their masters 
. . . .” Id. at 224. This lack of legal attention to the unifying clauses of Article IV was typical in the 
antebellum period. See FINKELMAN, supra note 76, at 30–34. 
194. FINKELMAN, supra note 76, at 125.
195. See id. at 126–27. 
196. Graham v. Strader, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 182 (1844). 
197. Hinds v. Brazealle, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 837, 842 (1838). 
198. Id. at 843. 
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Congress in 1820: that social orders based on slavery were intolerable and 
should be restricted at every opportunity. As long as such “self-
purification”199 remained confined to Northern states, the threat to the 
South was not that severe. The real danger to the South was that the self-
purification would become national, and that the principle of freedom, 
combined with the North’s growing political strength and the closer ties 
between the two sections, would override and overturn the Southern social 
order.200 In 1836, those fears were slowly rising to fever pitch. 
By 1850, state courts were reaching the same conclusion. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court, in finding for the slaveholder in the Dred Scott case, 
overturned three decades of precedents holding that long-term residence in 
a free state or territory frees a slave. Justifying this reversal in the law, the 
court noted that “[t]imes are not now as they were when the former deci-
sions on this subject were made.”201 Not only were the laws of free states 
inconsistent with Missouri’s social order, they were now regarded as posi-
tively hostile: 
[N]ot only individuals but States have been possessed with a dark 
and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought 
in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequences must be 
the overthrow and destruction of our government. Under such cir-
cumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the 
least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit.202
Several years later, the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals 
agreed, overruling several precedents that upheld the validity of emancipa-
tions performed in free states. The fact that Ohio regarded free blacks as 
citizens, the court wrote, was proof not only that Ohio’s laws were unde-
serving of comity in Mississippi, but that Ohio had actually violated the 
principle of comity and the law itself.203 “[I]t seems to me that comity is 
terminated by Ohio,” Justice Harris argued, “in the very act of degrading 
herself and her sister States, by the offensive association, and that the 
rights of Mississippi are outraged, when Ohio ministers to emancipation 
and the abolition of our institution of slavery, by such unkind, disrespect-
ful, lawless interference with our local rights.”204 Ohio, and by implica-
tion, all of the Northern states, had become societies gone mad. They 
were so alien, their social orders so incompatible, that Mississippi had no 
199. DAVIS, supra note 69, at 520.
200. See id. at 520–22; OAKES, supra note 70, at 167–72. 
201. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 586 (1852). 
202. Id.
203. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 263 (1859) 
204. Id.
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obligation even to recognize the rights of their citizens in court. To do so 
would be to disrupt and “degrade” Mississippi society as well.205
Northern courts too began reaching the decision that they had no obli-
gation to recognize statuses inconsistent with their societies. This went 
further than Justice Shaw’s decision in Aves; the holding of Aves was not 
that the status of a slave would change upon entering a free state but mere-
ly that the master could not use force to enforce it.206 Justice Wright of the 
New York Court of Appeals, concurring in the case of Lemmon v. 
People,207 noted that when it came to recognizing the status of a visitor to 
the state, only compatible statuses would be tolerated. “[N]o further than 
they are consistent with her own laws, and not repugnant or prejudicial to 
her domestic policy and interests, is the State required to give effect to 
these laws of the domicil.”208 The rule emerging in the North was, quite 
simply, zero tolerance for slavery. 
The Supreme Court eventually attempted to create a national principle 
on the status of free blacks where politics had failed. It did so in the case 
of Dred Scott.209 Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion adopted, in its 
entirety, the position Southerners had been arguing for the past thirty-
seven years: blacks could not be citizens because they had been deprived 
at the time of the Founding of the rights that were essential to citizenship. 
Taney’s argument ran like a replay of the Southern position in the Mis-
souri debates: he cited the laws in several states barring blacks from vot-
ing or serving in the militia;210 he noted the Massachusetts and Rhode Isl-
and prohibition on interracial marriages as proving “the degraded condi-
tion of this unhappy race”;211 and he distinguished the universal principles 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence.212 Taney admitted that indi-
vidual states could have made blacks citizens some time after the Found-
ing, but claimed that such “state citizenship” did not entitle them to any of 
the benefits of the Constitution.213 And if they were not national citizens at 
the time of the Founding, then they could not be citizens now; only Con-
gress could create new citizens, and then only by naturalization. States 
could not force citizens on other states that those other states did not ap-
205. Id.
206. The holding is thus reminiscent of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
207. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
208. Id. at 631–32 (Wright, J., concurring). 
209. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
210. See id. at 415–20. 
211. Id. at 409; see also id. at 413, 416. 
212. See id. at 410–11. Taney argued that the context made it clear to contemporaries that the 
phrase “all men are created equal” was only meant to have a limited application: “They perfectly 
understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and 
they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race 
. . . . They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the 
ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them.” Id. at 410. 
213. See id. at 405. 
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prove: “[N]o law of a State, therefore, passed since the Constitution was 
adopted, can give any right of citizenship outside of its own territory.”214
Part of Taney’s argument attempted to bootstrap his conclusion: blacks 
were not national citizens, and thus entitled to the protection of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, because of the bad results that would follow 
if they were entitled to privileges and immunities. If Northern free blacks 
were citizens, Taney argued, they would have the power to disrupt South-
ern societies merely by appearing in those states; they would have  
the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly 
or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruc-
tion, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they 
pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation . . . ; 
and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in 
private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; 
. . . and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.215
The reason why this was intolerable was clear: “[A]ll of this would be 
done in the face of the subject race of the same color, both free and 
slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and insubordination among 
them, and endangering the peace and safety of the State.”216 The Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, far from protecting blacks’ freedoms, divested 
blacks of them. The Clause “guaranties rights to the citizen, and the State 
cannot withhold them. And these rights are of a character and would lead 
to consequences which make it absolutely certain that the African race 
were not included under the name of citizens of a State . . . .”217
Dred Scott has generally been vilified as the worst decision in Su-
preme Court history.218 Most commentators think that this fact derives 
from more than its patent racism or its role in producing the Civil War. 
Justice Scalia has suggested that the decision’s badness is the result of its 
attempt to resolve a question that the politicians could not;219 yet, those 
same politicians had been practically begging the courts to decide the con-
stitutional issue of black status for decades. Furthermore, the Court had no 
choice: having been presented with a claim for diversity jurisdiction by 
214. Id. at 418. 
215. Id. at 417. 
216. Id.
217. Id. at 423. 
218. See, e.g., William P. Gary, Jr., “We the People” or “We the Judges”: A Reply to Robert R. 
Baugh’s Response, 49 ALA. L. REV. 607, 609 (1998) (describing the Court’s opinion as “tyrannical”); 
Robert G. Schwemm, Strader v. Graham: Kentucky’s Contribution to National Slavery Litigation and 
the Dred Scott Decision, 97 KY. L.J. 353, 433 (2009) (describing the decision as one of the Court’s 
worst).  
219. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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black individuals,220 the Court had to decide whether blacks were citizens 
for the purpose of Article III. Professor Robert Burt has suggested that 
Dred Scott’s badness came from the fact that it avoided answering the cen-
tral question: “whether, in view of the intense conflicts between [the 
states], it was necessary or even possible for them to remain members of 
the same political community.”221 This is closer to the truth. Dred Scott
was a bad decision, not because it chose one side of the debate, but be-
cause it adopted the rules of a social order that was obliterated by the fol-
lowing war. If the arguments of the dissenting justices had been adopted 
instead, war would have, if anything, occurred sooner. With the Supreme 
Court enforcing a hostile status regime, Northern voters returned a presi-
dent at the next opportunity who was committed to the eventual abolition 
of slavery. Secession followed. 
III. REPAIRING THE DAMAGE
A. The Purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
Once the Civil War ended, Congress began the task of fixing the prob-
lems that had led to the conflict. Foremost among those was the gulf that 
had emerged between the status regimes used in the states. The first and 
most obvious step was to abolish the institution of slavery, which Con-
gress did by passing the Thirteenth Amendment. But, as the Republicans 
in Congress were well aware, that still left substantial differences in state 
societies. The goal of Reconstruction was to ensure that nothing like the 
sectional division that led to the Civil War could happen again. 
To accomplish that goal, Congress passed several measures intended 
to provide a check on legal codifications of social status. In March 1866, 
relying on its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment,222 Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Civil Rights Act declared “all 
persons born in the United States . . . to be citizens of the United States,” 
having equal rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of person and property . . . .”223 The goal of the Civil 
Rights Act was to eliminate gradations of citizenship on the basis of race. 
220. The individuals were Dred Scott and the rest of his family: his wife Harriet, and daughters 
Eliza and Lizzie. For an analysis of the freedom claims of the entire family, see Lea VanderVelde & 
Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 (1997). 
221. Robert A. Burt, What Was Wrong with Dred Scott, What’s Right About Brown, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1, 16 (1985). 
222. Section 2 of the amendment provided that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.” 
223. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2008)). 
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But it was not entirely clear whether Congress had the authority to 
take such measures under the Thirteenth Amendment.224 In order to rectify 
that situation, Republicans in Congress began work on what would be-
come the Fourteenth Amendment. Mindful of their antebellum experience, 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended, among other things, 
to resolve the debates over the rights of citizens once and for all. 
Exactly how they intended to accomplish that remains shrouded in 
mystery.225 The various members of Congress who debated it did not have 
a clear, shared conception of how the words used in the Amendment re-
lated to its goals. The role of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is par-
ticularly unclear.226 Several members viewed the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as especially important in the protection of “fundamental rights,”227
such as those listed in the first eight amendments to the Constitution;228
others claimed not to know what it meant at all.229 Still others pointed pri-
marily to the Equal Protection Clause as the critical source of protection 
for blacks in the South.230
The potential role of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a broad 
protection for fundamental rights in the states was foreclosed seven years 
later in the Slaughter-House Cases.231 After Slaughter-House, the static list 
224. The Supreme Court finally confirmed Congress’s authority to pass the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 more than one hundred years later in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
225. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 90 (1988) (Fourteenth Amendment was “vague charter for the 
future”). The literature on the Fourteenth Amendment is vast. Even the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, which has been moribund for well over a century, has a substantial body of academic com-
mentary. See supra notes 13–24 and sources cited therein. 
226. The final text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment begins much as the Civil Rights Act 
did, by defining United States citizenship and then providing for protection of the rights of U.S. citi-
zens: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The definition of citizenship was added relatively late in the debate, after 
the proposed amendment had already passed the House. 
227. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1263 (1866) (speech of Rep. Broomall). 
228. See, e.g., id. at 1090 (speech of Rep. Bingham); id. at 474 (speech of Sen. Trumbull); see
also id. app. at 133 (speech of Rep. Rogers) (opposing congressional protection of privileges and 
immunities as massive federal intrusion into state protection of rights). 
229. See id. at 3039 (speech of Sen. Hendricks); id. at 3041 (speech of Sen. Johnson). 
230. Thaddeus Stevens in the House and Jacob Howard in the Senate relied more heavily in their 
defense of the proposed amendment on its provision of equal protection of the laws to all persons, 
regardless of race, and less on equal citizenship rights. See id. at 2459 (speech of Rep. Stevens); id. at 
2765–66 (speech of Sen. Howard). Indeed, Howard voted in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction 
several times to reject Rep. Bingham’s attempt to add protection for privileges and immunities to the 
resolution. 
231. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Gerard Magliocca has convincingly argued that Slaughter-
House did not end the debate over incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states; the final nail in 
incorporation’s coffin occurred twenty-seven years later, in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
See Gerard Magliocca, Why Did the Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Fail in the Late Nineteenth 
Century?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 102 (2009). However, the tenor of Slaughter-House clearly weighs 
against the Fourteenth Amendment intruding in any significant way on the authority of states to govern 
their own citizens, or what Slaughter-House calls the states’ “police power,” see 83 U.S. at 56, at 
82
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of substantive rights protected by the Clause was sharply limited to those 
implicit in the unamended Constitution, such as the right to sue in federal 
courts and the right to use navigable waterways. But the Slaughter-House
decision left untouched the Clause’s more dynamic protection for traveling 
citizens.232 And the legislative debate is clear that members of Congress 
viewed that protection as particularly important in light of recent events.233
The inclusion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment clearly hearkened back to antebellum debates over traveling 
Northern citizens. This is evident from two strands of the debate. First, a 
large number of the amendment’s supporters voiced the view that the pur-
pose of the amendment was merely to enforce the existing Constitution, 
specifically the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.234 Some of 
these statements were made in reference to the Bingham version of the 
amendment, which mimicked the wording of Article IV and the Fifth 
Amendment.235 But members of Congress persisted in describing the pro-
posed amendment this way even after it took its modern form.236
Such descriptions may seem to make little sense today, when the Ar-
ticle IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 
are viewed as having vastly different purposes. Indeed, in a recently pub-
lished article, Kurt Lash argues that contemporary usage of the phrase 
“privileges and immunities” in 1866 clearly distinguished between the 
privileges and immunities arising from state citizenship and privileges and 
immunities arising from national citizenship.237 Under this view, therefore, 
the difference in wording between Bingham’s first version of the amend-
ment, introduced in February 1866, and the second version, reported out 
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction in May, is tremendously signifi-
cant. Lash argues that the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
least outside of the context of racial discrimination. That makes Maxwell a logical, if not inevitable, 
follow-up to Slaughter-House.
232. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 72–75 (1872). (14th Amendment Privileges and Immunities 
Clause extends to national citizens in all locations throughout the United States, regardless of original 
state of citizenship).  
233. Id. at 71–72. 
234. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1082 (speech of Sen. Stewart); id. at 1089, 1095 
(speech of Rep. Bingham); id. at 2539 (speech of Rep. Farnsworth); id. at 2542 (speech of Rep. 
Bingham); id. at 2961 (speech of Sen. Poland); id. at 3031, 3034 (speech of Sen. Henderson). 
235. The original version of the Fourteenth Amendment, drafted by Rep. Bingham and reported out 
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, read: “The Congress shall have power to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the 
rights of life, liberty, and property.” Id. at 1034 (speech of Rep. Bingham). The most notable differ-
ence between this proposal and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is its structure: it grants Con-
gress power to legislate on certain subjects, instead of enacting a prohibition on states backed by 
Congressional power to enforce. After three days of debate in the House, further consideration of the 
Bingham proposal was suspended; months later the Joint Committee on Reconstruction reported a 
proposal much closer to the final product. 
236. See supra note 234 and sources cited therein. 
237. See Lash, supra note 31, at 1280. 
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United States” would have been understood as referring to a much nar-
rower set of rights, akin to those few identified by Justice Miller in his 
Slaughter-House Cases opinion.238
There are at least two significant difficulties with this argument, how-
ever. One is that some of the evidence of contemporary meaning that Lash 
presents is drawn from the somewhat different context of a treaty promis-
ing foreign subjects all of the “privileges, rights, and immunities of United 
States citizens.”239 But the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
not have had international treaty usage foremost on their minds; they 
would have been thinking of the antebellum debates over the rights of 
Northern citizens.240 And that history, as detailed above, did not distin-
guish sharply between state citizens and national citizens; indeed, that was 
what the whole debate was about. Second, and relatedly, there is no evi-
dence, at least in the congressional debates over the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, that lawyers in 1866 made a clear distinction between the privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several states and the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States. Bingham himself saw no differ-
ence; nor did any participant in the 1866 debates identify one. In fact, 
opponents of the amendment seemed to believe that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause went too far in denying states the ability to regulate 
activities that they always had, a view that is inconsistent with Miller’s 
view of the narrowness of the Clause. The closest members of Congress 
came to asserting that privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States had an alternative meaning was to assert that they did not under-
stand what it meant. 
There is a danger of overstating the clarity of the ideas swirling 
throughout the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress. But 
the Republicans, at least, seem to have seen the references to privileges 
and immunities in the proposed amendment—both versions of it—as re-
solving the longstanding debate over the ability of individual states to de-
termine who qualified for the socio-legal status of “citizen” and what 
rights accompanied that designation.241 For example, several members 
declared that the purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to 
guarantee the rights of Northern citizens traveling in Southern states. Rep-
resentative John Bingham described his proposal as requiring “that South 
Carolina, and that Ohio as well, shall be bound to respect the rights of the 
humblest citizen of the remotest State of the Republic when he may he-
238. Id. at 1243. 
239. Id. at 1285. 
240. Although his article is not in final published form at the time of this writing, it appears that 
Philip Hamburger will emphasize this point in response to Lash as well. See Hamburger, supra note 
16, at 42–43. 
241. See id. at 1282–84 . 
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reafter come within her jurisdiction.”242 Bingham’s choice of states was 
not accidental; one of the causes of the war, in Republicans’ view, was 
that Southern states had not respected the rights of Northern citizens. The 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was an attempt to fix that, by bolstering 
the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.243
One of the specific concerns of the framers was in preventing the 
abuse experienced by antislavery activists in the South. “[F]or the last 
thirty years,” lamented Rep. Hiram Price of Iowa, it “has not been the 
case” that Northern citizens were accorded equal treatment under the Pri-
vileges and Immunities Clause.244
A citizen of a slave State could come into a free State at any time 
during the last quarter of a century and express his opinion on any 
subject connected with State rights or any other which agitated the 
public mind; but if a citizen of a free State visiting a slave State 
expressed his opinion in reference to slavery he was treated with-
out much ceremony to a coat of tar and feathers and a ride upon a 
rail.245
The goal of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, therefore, was to rectify 
this situation by giving the federal government the power to stop such 
abuses. As Rep. John Broomall of Pennsylvania noted: 
[S]trange as it may seem, while the Government has been always 
held competent to protect its meanest citizen within the domain of 
any European potentate, it has been considered powerless to guard 
the citizen of Pennsylvania against the illegal arrest, under color of 
State law, of the most subordinate officer of the most obscure mu-
nicipality in Virginia. Strange as it may seem, while the Govern-
ment of the United States has been held competent to protect the 
lowest menial of the minister of the most obscure prince in Eu-
rope, anywhere between the two oceans, and from the Lakes to 
the Gulf, it had no power to protect the personal liberty of the 
242. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 158 (1866); see also id. at 1066 (speech of Rep. Price) 
(“I understand [the Bingham amendment] to mean simply this: if a citizen of Iowa or a citizen of 
Pennsylvania has any business, or if curiosity has induced him to visit the State of South Carolina or 
Georgia, he shall have the same protection of the laws there that he would have had had he lived there 
for ten years.”); id. app. at 293 (speech of Rep. Shellabarger) (arguing that bill to protect privileges 
and immunities would protect travelers’ rights). 
243. Id. at 1054 (speech of Rep. Higby) (“The intent of this amendment is to give force and effect 
and vitality to that provision of the Constitution which has been regarded heretofore as nugatory and 
powerless.”). 
244. Id. at 1066. (statement of Rep. Price). 
245. Id.
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agent of the State of Massachusetts in the city of Charleston, or 
enable him to sue in the State courts.246
Broomall’s last hypothetical was a veiled reference to the Hoar expedi-
tion,247 a common theme in the debates over the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause. Both John Bingham and Lyman Trumbull, leaders of the effort to 
pass the amendment in the House and Senate, referred explicitly to the 
Hoar incident as something barred by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.248 The citation to the Hoar expedition is significant, because it was 
not only Judge Hoar’s rights that were allegedly violated; the entire pur-
pose of Hoar’s trip was to assert the rights of black Massachusetts citi-
zens. Bingham explicitly noted Hoar’s “peaceful mission of asserting . . . 
the rights of American citizens” in condemning South Carolina’s “utter[ ] 
disregard[ ]” for the Privileges and Immunities Clause.249
The rights of black Northern citizens were at the heart of the meaning 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. As discussed above, the argument 
had been made throughout the antebellum period by Northerners that the 
status of state citizenship, once bestowed, required fellow states to accord 
that state citizen full citizenship rights as he or she traveled through their 
jurisdictions. In other words, if Massachusetts recognized a black man as a 
citizen, South Carolina could not refuse to treat that man as a citizen under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Southerners argued that the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause only required states to grant individuals the 
same status as resident individuals of that class received. If South Carolina 
did not recognize resident free blacks as citizens, then it did not have to 
recognize Massachusetts free blacks as citizens either. 
It seems to have been almost universally agreed that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause would change that. The purpose of protecting the privi-
leges and immunities of United States citizens was to succeed where the 
Article IV clause had failed: by preventing states from refusing to recog-
nize the citizenship status accorded by other states. Even in the antebellum 
era, Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri argued that federal citizenship 
could not “be given or taken away by State action. . . . [O]nce the charac-
ter of citizen of the United States attaches, no State, I apprehend, can take 
it away.” 250 Henderson cited as authority Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in 
Dred Scott:
246. Id. at 1263 (statement of Rep. Broomall). 
247. See supra text accompanying notes 154-159. 
248. See id. at 158 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (proposing Bingham amendment); id. at 474 
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) (defending Civil Rights Act as enforcement of Article IV). 
249. Id. at 158 (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
250. Id. at 3032 (statement of Sen. Henderson). 
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If persons of the African race are citizens of a State and of the 
United States, they would be entitled to all of these privileges and 
immunities in every State, and the State could not restrict them; 
for they would hold these privileges and immunities under the pa-
ramount authority of the Federal Government, and its courts 
would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the constitution and 
laws of the State notwithstanding.251
Other members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress similarly viewed the Ar-
ticle IV Privileges and Immunities Clause as prohibiting discrimination 
against foreign state citizens who happened to be black. Sen. William M. 
Stewart of Nevada argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause al-
ready prohibited state restrictions on the travel of free blacks.252 Senator 
Luke Poland of Vermont agreed, but noted that the clause had been unen-
forceable—and remained unenforceable—due to the  
radical difference in the social systems of the several States, and 
the great extent to which the doctrine of State rights or State sove-
reignty was carried, induced mainly, as I believe, by and for the 
protection of the peculiar system of the South, [which] led to a 
practical repudiation of the existing provision on this subject 
. . . .253
Rep. John M. Broomall of Pennsylvania argued that the amendment was 
necessary to protect “the rights and immunities of citizens” as they tra-
veled in Southern states: “the right of speech, the right of transit, the right 
of domicil, the right to sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the right of 
petition.”254
Even opponents of the Amendment argued that it would require states 
to recognize citizenship status determinations made outside the state. For 
example, in opposing the protection of the privileges and immunities of 
United States citizens, Rep. Michael C. Kerr of Indiana argued that doing 
so would “defy and set aside the right of each State, in the exercise of its 
251. Id. (quoting Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 423 (1857), superseded by consti-
tutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
252. See id. at 1082 (statement of Sen. Stewart). 
253. Id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Poland). Rep. William Higby of California argued that had the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause been enforced, “a citizen of New York would have been treated as a 
citizen in the State of South Carolina; a citizen of Massachusetts would have been regarded as a citizen 
in the State of Mississippi or Louisiana.” Id. at 1054. South Carolina and Louisiana were notorious in 
the antebellum period for restricting the travel of Northern black sailors from seaboard states like 
Massachusetts and New York. 
254. Id. at 1263 (statement of Rep. Broomall). Indeed, as Broomall noted, more was at stake than 
the rights of travelers; black northern citizens were not even accorded due process if apprehended in 
northern states by southern slaveowners. See id.
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own judgment, to exclude certain persons from its boundaries, or to with-
hold from them certain civil rights.” 
The people of the State may be convinced, no matter how firmly, 
that such classes are unfit to be admitted to live with them or to 
share full civil rights with them, or that their presence will tend to 
demoralize or to destroy their society and ultimately their institu-
tions. But all this makes no difference. They have no right to have 
any opinions on these subjects. The sacred right of self-defense is 
to this extent surrendered by them and by the States to Con-
gress.255
Kerr argued instead that the supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment had 
interpreted the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause incorrectly. 
Citizenship status, he argued, did not travel. A person “may have all the 
rights and privileges of the citizen of a State and yet not be entitled to the 
rights and privileges in any other State. . . . Such a citizen, removing to 
another State, is then entitled only to such privileges as are accorded by 
the laws of that State to persons of the same class.”256
Kerr’s argument identified a difficult line-drawing problem for Repub-
licans. As in the antebellum period, the question of which classifications 
among foreign state citizens were forbidden was difficult to answer. The 
reductio ad absurdum posed repeatedly to Republicans was to explain how 
the amendment would not eliminate all distinctions drawn between women 
and men. For example, Rep. Robert S. Hale of New York challenged his 
fellow Republicans to explain how the amendment would permit Congress 
to abolish race discrimination but not sex discrimination:  
Take the case of the rights of married women; did any one ever 
assume that Congress was to be invested with the power to legis-
late on that subject, and to say that married women, in regard to 
their rights of property, should stand on the same footing with 
men and unmarried women?257
Thaddeus Stevens responded that, as long as a state regulated within a 
certain classification equally, the amendment would not apply, but Stevens 
offered no principle that distinguished the two situations. If the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Hale noted, means only that  
255. Id. at 1268 (statement of Rep. Kerr). 
256. Id. at 1268–69 (statement of Rep. Kerr). Kerr’s remarks occurred during debate over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. 
257. Id. at 1064. Hale raised his objection in response to the Equal Protection Clause, but it applied 
equally to the understanding many legislators had of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which 
among other things was intended to prohibit unequal treatment of foreign state citizens. 
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[Y]ou shall extend to one married woman the same protection you 
extend to another, and not the same you extend to unmarried 
women or men, then by parity of reasoning it will be sufficient if 
you extend to one negro the same rights you do to another, but not 
those you extend to a white man.258
John Bingham, the drafter of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, of-
fered a similar response to Hale: “[W]ho ever heard it intimated that any-
body could have property protected in any State until he owned or ac-
quired property there according to its local law or according to the law of 
some other State which he may have carried thither?”259 In other words, 
the ability of married women to own property was subject to state law. As 
long as the state law operated equally within all of the classifications it 
drew, there was no equal protection problem.260
None of the Republicans identified any principled way of determining 
which classifications were permitted and which were not. But Bingham’s 
response hints at one possible answer for resolving the issue under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The antebellum debate over Article IV 
focused on whether black northern citizens had to be accorded full citizen-
ship rights in southern states, or could be given the rights that black sou-
therners would get. In other words, the debate was about whether Massa-
chusetts’s decision to grant citizenship status to blacks traveled with them 
or was localized to Massachusetts. Bingham’s response suggests that the 
prevalence of such state status determinations might determine whether a 
determination travels. Where a contrary status determination is rare or 
novel, then other states may be free to ignore it when individuals with that 
status visit the state, as a hypothetical property-owning married woman 
might have been in 1866. But if the contrary status is accorded by a sub-
stantial number of states, and that number is stable, then it is more akin to 
black citizenship. At that point, fellow states are no longer free to apply 
their own subclassifications and ignore the state status determination. 
B. After Slaughter-House
The most vigorous debate today over the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause concerns whether it was intended to be 
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1089. 
260. Senator Howard responded to a similar question later in the year, concerning whether the 
extension of suffrage to blacks would lead to suffrage for women, that “there [i]s such a thing as the 
law of nature which has a certain influence even in political affairs, and that by that law women and 
children were not regarded as the equals of men.” Id. at 2767. But of course, many contemporaries 
said the same thing about blacks and whites. 
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the vessel by which Congress overturned Barron v. Baltimore261 and made 
the protections in the Bill of Rights directly applicable against the states. 
Scholars, lawyers, and judges have long debated the mechanism by which 
some or all of the Bill of Rights have been “incorporated” into the restric-
tions imposed on states in Section 1 of the Amendment, and how to deter-
mine which rights are incorporated. Whatever the answer to those ques-
tions, the Supreme Court long ago took a different path.262 In the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases,263 the Supreme Court considered a claim by New Or-
leans butchers that a state-mandated slaughterhouse monopoly violated 
their privileges and immunities—specifically, the privilege of carrying on 
their trade as butchers. This presented exactly the situation that opponents 
of the Fourteenth Amendment warned about: the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause was being used to override ordinary state legislation.264
To avoid that conclusion, the majority opinion in Slaughter-House fo-
cused on the use of the phrase “citizens of the United States” in the 
Clause. The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice Miller noted, applied 
only to “citizens of the United States,” not to citizens generally.265 Miller 
held that this was a crucial distinction.266 The court bifurcated American 
citizenship between state and national citizenship, each with its own rights 
and, presumably, obligations.267 The core freedoms arose from state citi-
zenship, not national citizenship.268 The Fourteenth Amendment protected 
only such privileges and immunities that “owe their existence to the Fed-
eral government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”269
As examples, the Court suggested the right to go to the seat of the national 
government, free access to seaports and navigable waterways, access to 
courts, and the writ of habeas corpus. “[F]or all the great purposes for 
which the Federal government was established,” Justice Miller concluded, 
quoting Chief Justice Taney, “we are one people, with one common coun-
try, we are all citizens of the United States.”270
261. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
262. The Court shows no signs of retracing its path any time soon. In McDonald v. City of Chica-
go, only one justice showed any interest in reversing Slaughter-House; the others brushed the sugges-
tion aside. See 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030–31 (2010) (plurality op. of Alito, J.) (“We see no need to re-
consider that interpretation here.”). In general, this Article assumes a common law approach, rather 
than an originalist approach, to constitutional interpretation. Although it is not dispositive, history 
matters, and Slaughter-House is settled law. 
263. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
264. That is, the court held that the Louisiana law, which was ostensibly passed as a health and 
safety measure for the regulation of the slaughtering trade in a large city, was a core exercise of Loui-
siana’s “police power.” Id. at 62. The “police power” would soon become a key component of litiga-
tion over economic regulations. 
265. Id. at 74. 
266. Id. at 73–74. 
267. Id. at 74. 
268. See id. at 77. 
269. Id. at 79. 
270. Id.
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The Slaughter-House Cases marked a turning point in the history of 
Reconstruction; they were the first in a series of decisions in which the 
Supreme Court scaled back the potential reach of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. Slaughter-House was the beginning of Reconstruction’s 
Thermidor. Within the next several years, the Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not reach private actions that denied civil rights,271
including conspiracies to use violence,272 and the Compromise of 1877 
ended congressional efforts to enforce Reconstruction in the South.273 The 
Fourteenth Amendment remained largely dormant as a protector of indi-
vidual rights until the 1930s.274
The Slaughter-House Cases certainly blunted the effectiveness of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as a tool in the later Civil Rights struggle. 
When that struggle began, litigants and the courts looked instead to the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause as doctrinal avenues 
for the protection of rights that had not been closed off. But there still re-
mains some content to the Privileges or Immunities Clause after Slaughter-
House. Although it has only been successfully invoked twice since 1873,275
it still prohibits states from interfering with certain privileges of national 
citizenship, including a component of the right to travel: the right of mi-
grants from other states “to be treated like other citizens of that State.”276
The component of the Privileges or Immunities Clause discussed 
above fits into this residual category of rights still protected by the Clause. 
Preventing states from imposing idiosyncratic classifications on foreign 
state citizens not only protects those citizens as they travel, it also ad-
dresses the fundamental federalist problem of entrenched inconsistent sta-
tus determinations. That is, it enforces the notion that “we are one people, 
with one common country,”277 and one common citizenship. The death of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Slaughter-House has therefore been 
exaggerated. 
271. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
272. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
273. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 
582 (1988) (“Among other things, 1877 marked a decisive retreat from the idea, born during the Civil 
War, of a powerful national state protecting the fundamental rights of American citizens.”). 
274. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) (failure to provide 
law school for black students violated duty to provide “equality of the privileges which the laws give 
to the separated groups within the State”). 
275. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (differential taxation of in-state and out-of-state 
loan income violated Privileges or Immunities Clause), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 
83 (1940); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
276. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500. Philip Hamburger has recently concluded, as I do, that the antebellum 
debate over the rights of traveling free blacks is significant in determining the meaning of the Privileg-
es or Immunities Clause. See Hamburger, supra note 17. However, Hamburger concludes that equali-
ty for travelers was all the Clause was intended to do—an interpretation Slaughter-House itself rejects 
by giving some (although slight) substantive content to the Clause. 
277. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). 
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IV. THE REEMERGENCE OF A STATUS REGIME CONFLICT
The resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause could not 
come at a more opportune time. Another status regime conflict—over 
same-sex marriages—is beginning to emerge. Like the Missouri debate 
before it, the debate over same-sex marriages bears the hallmarks of an 
emerging status regime conflict. It comes as a postrevolutionary genera-
tion works out the full implications of the universalistic statements of the 
recent past. In our case, the recent revolution is the Civil Rights Move-
ment. The Civil Rights Movement is likely the single most important de-
velopment in American political and legal culture in the twentieth century. 
Certainly the most famous Supreme Court case during the past century is 
Brown v. Board of Education.278 If the antebellum debates over slavery 
primarily concerned whether states could maintain a caste system that 
stripped Americans of the privileges of citizenship according to race, 
Brown and the Civil Rights Movement stood for the principle that states 
could not even indirectly enforce such subordination through the operation 
of the law. 
Still, when the Civil Rights Movement began, it was not immediately 
anticipated that its principles would spread far beyond its original contex-
tual bounds: equality under the law for southern blacks. Since Brown,
however, a web of egalitarian principles has been spun of uncertain di-
mension. Once restricted to blacks and to education, the principles have 
stretched to embrace women, Hispanics, Indians, employment opportuni-
ties, the rights of the accused, matters of privacy, and much more. The 
key principle in this cultural revolution has been individual and group 
equality, as encoded in law by the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause. Important fights have therefore occurred over exactly 
which persons and rights are covered by these clauses, and to what ex-
tent.279
As Americans have moved beyond the original generation that expe-
rienced the Civil Rights Movement, they have met difficult and unantici-
pated problems in applying formal, legal equality to all groups while main-
taining an effective status regime. As free blacks were in the antebellum 
period, so gays and lesbians are now—people who, by their very exis-
tence, challenge existing structures and test the limits of universalistic 
principles. At the same time, the ability of the federal system to absorb 
278. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
279. Women, for example, are covered, but only to the extent that discriminatory laws fail to have 
a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256 (1979). Homosexuals, so far, are only covered inasmuch as anyone else is covered—
against irrational classifications. The Court has held that mere dislike of homosexuals is not a rational 
basis for legislation. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 196 n.8 (1986) (declining to consider Equal Protection question). 
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small disturbances in status judgments has decreased over time. The feder-
al government is now a major factor in the lives of ordinary citizens, much 
more so than state or local governments; federal courts stand ready in 
nearly every city to pronounce the rights of citizens anywhere and, conse-
quently, everywhere. Informal structures have also become more intert-
wined: a tight national community has emerged, unified by fast travel, 
extreme mobility, and mass media. The result is that a change of status in 
one of the states would spread with the next flight out of the local airport. 
If that status is supported by the laws of the state, and the unifying clauses 
of Article IV are read strictly, a collision between the law and the social 
structures of other states could happen instantaneously. 
The legal system is, thus, presently perched on a narrow point of 
compromise between broad legal principles and social reality. Like the 
Founders who recognized, theoretically, only one class of citizen, yet 
wished to distinguish between citizens, modern Americans avow that all 
groups should have formal equality under the law, yet still wish to pre-
serve the law’s support for the most important discriminating aspects of 
the social system under which they live. Explicit judgments encoding so-
cial norms concerning gender, for example, are recognized to contradict 
the principle of formal group equality.280 As a result, the system has no 
principled bases on which to uphold the more central discriminating 
norms. This means that the legal system will be perpetually challenged to 
defend weak claims until the discrepancy is resolved. And, as with the 
antebellum debate over the rights of free blacks, the debate over same-sex 
marriages will take refuge, at least for a time, in the nebula of federalism. 
In this Part, the first Subpart identifies the possible reemergence of a 
status regime conflict over same-sex marriages. Unlike the first status re-
gime conflict, however, this time the Constitution contains a potential 
work-around for the problem: the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The 
second Subpart explains how the Privileges or Immunities Clause, more 
than any other provision in the Constitution, addresses the problem of sta-
tus regime conflicts, despite limiting decisions such as Slaughter-House.
280. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). The Diaz 
court held:  
“While we recognize that the public’s expectation of finding one sex in a particular role 
may cause some initial difficulty, it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the pre-
ferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was 
valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices [Title VII] was meant to over-
come.” 
Id. at 389. Ironically, prisoners’ “preferences and prejudices” get more deference from the federal 
courts than customers’ do. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (“There would . . . 
be a real risk that . . . inmates . . . would assault women guards because they were women.”). 
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A. Same-Sex Marriage and Gender Norms  
Like the antebellum debate over free blacks, the debate over same-sex 
marriage is occurring at a time of flux in the way status is accorded. The 
early nineteenth century was the time period when the racial caste system 
flourished in the South and adamant opposition to slavery swept the North. 
The norms challenged by same-sex marriages—and by acceptance of gays 
and lesbians in general—are traditional gender norms. 
Gender is of critical importance in making status determinations. Of 
all categories humans use to classify each other, gender is the single most 
salient class. Studies have shown that subjects will remember the gender 
of an individual they encountered more often than any other trait, such as 
age, race, occupation, or name.281 Not only do people notice an individu-
al’s gender, but they will make immediate judgments based on that gender 
and have been trained to do so since infancy. From the moment a person 
is born, he or she is trained to exhibit and recognize the appropriate beha-
viors for his or her gender.282 Parents and others impart this knowledge 
without even realizing it.283 Children quickly pick up on these cues; by age 
two, although only having a vocabulary of roughly twenty-nine words and 
relatively primitive cognitive functioning, children can correctly describe 
their own gender and “can select gender-associated toys and future occu-
pations at greater than chance levels.”284
By the time children reach adulthood, gender-based norms are a per-
vasive and critical part of their self-identity. As one psychologist has ex-
plained, “If one had to predict a person’s life course on the basis of a sin-
281. See Alan Page Fiske et al., Confusing One Person with Another: What Errors Reveal About 
the Elementary Forms of Social Relations, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656 (1991); Kathleen 
E. Grady, Androgyny Reconsidered, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 172 (J.H. Williams ed., 1979). 
282. See Phyllis A. Katz, Gender Identity: Development & Consequences, in THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF FEMALE-MALE RELATIONS 21, 41 (Richard D. Ashmore & Frances K. Del Boca 
eds., 1986); Eleanor E. Maccoby & Carol Nagy Jacklin, Gender Segregation in Childhood, in 20 
ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT & BEHAVIOR 239, 239–88 (Hayne W. Reese ed. 1987); LISA A.
SERBIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX TYPING IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD (1993). As one research-
er has concluded, “It is inarguable . . . that gender is one of the earliest and most central components 
of the self concept and serves as an organizing principle through which many experiences and percep-
tions of self and other are filtered.” Janet T. Spence, Gender Identity and Its Implications for Concepts 
of Masculinity and Femininity, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: PSYCHOLOGY AND 
GENDER 59–96 (T.B. Sonderegger ed., 1985). 
283. For example, in one well-known study, subjects were asked to evaluate the videotaped reac-
tions of a nine-month-old child startled by a jack-in-the-box. Half the subjects were told the child was 
male, the other half female. More of those who were told that the child was male believed its reaction 
to the jack-in-the-box to be “anger;” more of those told the child was female believed the child to be 
“frightened.” See John Condry & Sandra Condry, Sex Differences: A Study of the Eye of the Beholder,
47 CHILD DEV. 812 (1976); see also John C. Condry & David F. Ross, Sex and Aggression: The 
Influence of Gender Label on the Perception of Aggression in Children, 56 CHILD DEV. 225 (1985). 
This may explain the discomfort and confusion many adults experience when interacting with a child 
whose gender is not immediately apparent. See Katz, supra note 282, at 30. 
284. See Katz, supra note 282, at 22; see also id. at 34–35. 
88
166 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 62:1:111 
gle attribute, the best choice would probably be gender.”285 Gender norms 
prescribe how one is supposed to act, dress, and talk; who one should 
associate with, and how; and where one’s talents should lie.286 Those 
norms are enforced in the same way as other social norms: through pri-
marily informal sanctions meant to increase or decrease the target’s status 
according to how well the target plays by the rules.287 While not everyone 
may be active in policing gender boundaries, individuals who are more 
strongly attached to the existing status regime in a group or community 
will tend to be more active in enforcing it, including norms against homo-
sexuality.288 Enforcement techniques can range from gossip, insults, and 
other nonphysical shaming mechanisms, to physical violence.289
An important part of gender norms governs appropriate behavior in in-
teracting with other individuals of either the same sex or the opposite sex. 
Part of what it means to be male under the current status regime is to be 
attracted to females, and not males, and vice versa for women. Some of 
these relationships receive formal recognition from the state in the form of 
marriage. Homosexual men and women, just by their very existence, chal-
lenge that structure. Two developments have exacerbated that tension in 
recent years, both the result of the changes wrought by the Civil Rights 
Movement in the twentieth century. First, gender norms in general have 
285. Id. at 21. 
286. Gender is not necessarily the basis for ascriptions of high or low status per se; rather, gender 
norms prescribe rules, with high status as a reward for following the rules. See Richard D. Ashmore 
et al., Gender Stereotypes, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FEMALE-MALE RELATIONS, supra note 
280, at 69, 99–101; Frances K. Del Boca et al., Gender-Related Attitudes, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
FEMALE-MALE RELATIONS, supra note 280, at 121, 124–25. 
287. Status is accorded by both members of the same sex and members of the opposite sex. For 
cross-sex harassment, see the activities described in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. 
Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); for same-sex enforcement, see Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 
U.S. App. LEXIS 766 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992). 
288. See L.A. Kohlberg, A Cognitive-Developmental Analysis of Children’s Sex-Role Concepts and 
Attitudes, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX DIFFERENCES 82 (E.E. Maccoby ed., 1966); Deborrah E.S. 
Frable, Sex Typing and Gender Ideology: Two Facets of the Individual’s Gender Psychology that Go 
Together, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 95 (1989); Alan Taylor, Conceptions of Masculinity 
and Femininity as a Basis for Stereotypes of Male and Female Homosexuals, 9 J. HOMOSEXUALITY,
no. 1, 1983 at 37. 
289. In extreme situations, norm-enforcing, extra-legal violence can reach ritualistic proportions. 
Victims of anti-gay violence are “more apt to be stabbed a dozen or more times, mutilated, and stran-
gled[, and i]n a number of instances stabbed or mutilated after being fatally shot.” Brian Miller & 
Laud Humphreys, Lifestyles and Violence: Homosexual Victims of Assault and Murder, 3 
QUALITATIVE SOC. 169, 179 (1980); see also GARY DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 47 (1991) (quoting Miller & Humphreys). As Kenji Yoshino has noted, 
there seems to be more to such violence than a desire to do simple physical harm. “The lesson of the 
body that needs to be stabbed even after such stabbings have rendered it a corpse is that homosexuali-
ty, like a disease, may leave its traces in the body even after life has passed out of it . . . .” Kenji 
Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1753, 1825 (1996). Such attacks resemble those against blacks in the post-Civil War era, de-
scribed in Charles L Flynn, Jr., The Ancient Pedigree of Violent Repression: Georgia’s Klan as a Folk 
Movement, in THE SOUTHERN ENIGMA: ESSAYS ON RACE, CLASS, AND FOLK CULTURE 189 (Walter J. 
Fraser Jr. & Winfred B. Moore Jr. eds., 1983). 
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undergone significant change in the last forty years; women are now much 
more economically independent and are prevalent, if still underrepre-
sented, in many workplaces in positions of authority. The norms govern-
ing appropriate behavior for men and women have similarly shifted 
enormously and are still in flux. Second, the ideal of the Civil Rights 
Movement, that all groups should be treated equally and have equal oppor-
tunities, is driving both the longstanding push for gender equality and the 
more recent effort to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
which is the source of the same-sex marriage effort. 
Same-sex marriages, where they are recognized, formalize a new and 
starkly different status regime from the one described above: one in which 
homosexual relationships are formally accorded as much respect by the 
state and society as heterosexual relationships. This undermines norms and 
status determinations that rely on the low status of homosexuality and on 
certain norms of behavior for interactions between members of the same 
or opposite sexes—for example, that romantic behavior is appropriate only 
towards certain members of the opposite sex in certain situations.290 Al-
though same-sex marriage is not the most direct challenge possible to these 
norms,291 it still threatens a large shift with attendant uncertainty about the 
consequences.292 The endorsement of the state makes this change not only 
more visible but potentially irreversible. 
B. The Defense of Marriage Act  
The emergence of same-sex marriage as a status regime conflict can 
be detected, as it was before, in an extended congressional debate that 
occurred as tensions began to rise. That debate occurred in 1996, when 
Congress attempted to stem the tide of legalized same-sex marriage in the 
United States by passing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The law 
was a response to a 1993 Hawaii decision holding that the state’s refusal to 
290. There is a large and complex web of norms governing romantic relationships, only some of 
which deal with gender. 
291. Although far-fetched, an even more direct challenge would be to simply ban, or informally 
shame, opposite-sex relationships altogether. 
292. The uncertainty comes from any shift in a status regime. See Natalie S. Glance & Bernardo A. 
Huberman, The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas, SCI. AM., Mar. 1994, at 76, 78–79. Part of the fear of 
uncertainty stems from the fact that norm adoption is a long-term investment, which deters even liber-
ally-minded parents from teaching their children nonstandard gender norms. Parents do not want their 
children to become early adopters of a status regime that fails. See Katz, supra note 280, at 49. To put 
it in terms of technology adoption, parents considering whether to teach their children a nonstandard 
gender ideology do not know in advance whether they are investing in DVDs or 8-track cassettes. 
Opponents of same-sex marriage in Maine appear to have successfully tapped into this uncertainty with 
advertisements claiming that if same-sex marriage became legal, homosexuality would be taught in 
schools. David Sharp, Gay Marriage Foes Win With Message About Schools, VENTURA COUNTY 
STAR, Nov. 6, 2009, available at http:// www.vcstar.com/ news/ 2009/ nov/ 06/ gay-marriage-foes-
win-with-message-about-schools/. 
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grant same-sex marriages was sex discrimination which needed to pass 
strict scrutiny.293 The prospect that Hawaii would soon grant marriages to 
same-sex couples exposed an assumed, but not formalized, norm govern-
ing marriage—that it was available only for heterosexual relationships. 
The prospect that the Supreme Court of Hawaii would compel the 
state to recognize same-sex marriages set off a storm of anxiety through-
out the rest of the nation. If same-sex marriages became legal in one state, 
they could potentially “travel” to other states by way of the unifying 
clauses of Article IV—in this case, the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The 
mere possibility of legally recognized homosexual relationships sent states 
scrambling for legal cover by passing statutes that affirmatively declared 
that marriage in their states could only take place between men and wom-
en.294 Congress joined in the scramble by considering a law that would 
restrict the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Under the portion 
of the Clause giving Congress the power to prescribe the “Effect” of full 
faith and credit, Congress has decided it has the power to prescribe no 
effect at all for same-sex marriages. 
The debate over DOMA in Congress bears all of the hallmarks of a 
status regime conflict. First, it involved an attempt to apply universal rhe-
toric beyond implied boundaries. Second, there were claims that the ability 
to draw all status distinctions would disappear. Third, the challenge to the 
existing status regime was portrayed as an insult. And finally, resistance to 
the change was justified as self-defense. 
First, the debate over same-sex marriage reveals a conflict between the 
rhetoric of equality that emerged from the Civil Rights Movement and a 
presumption of privileged heterosexual status. That presumption explained 
the fact that many states did not formally limit marriage to heterosexual 
couples. Members of Congress in 1996 revealed the assumptions underly-
ing the prevailing status regime by expressing their surprise that same-sex 
marriage was even conceivable. “It is incomprehensible to me,” Senator 
Robert Byrd of West Virginia declared, “that federal legislation would be 
needed to provide a definition of two terms that for thousands of years 
have been perfectly clear and unquestioned.”295 Not only was it incompre-
293. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 
1993). On remand, shortly after DOMA passed, the lower court held that Hawaii could show no 
compelling government interest in denying same-sex couples the right to marry. Baehr v. Miike, No. 
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The decision was appealed, and the Hawaii 
Supreme Court would likely have upheld the Circuit Court’s decision. However, in 1998 Hawaii’s 
voters ratified a constitutional amendment giving the state legislature the power to reserve marriage to 
opposite-sex couples. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws H.B. 117 § 2, at 1247 (proposing HAW. CONST. art. 
I, § 23). The Hawaii Supreme Court then rejected the challenge to the state marriage law. Baehr v. 
Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (Dec. 9, 1999). 
294. Forty states have passed such laws, either as statutes or as constitutional amendments. See
supra notes 36–37. 
295. 142 CONG. REC. S10,108 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996); see also Defense of Marriage Act: Hear-
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hensible, it was threatening. “It is a sign of the times,” Senator Dan Coats 
of Indiana railed, “and an indication of a deep moral confusion.”296
Proponents of the bill were more than puzzled by same-sex marriage; 
they were indignant that any state was considering granting the status of 
marriage to gay and lesbian couples. That is, they found the concept in-
sulting. Representative Bob Barr declared that if someone had told him 
that the 104th Congress would have to pass a law defining marriage, “I 
probably would have said they were crazy. This is America. This is 
America.”297 Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina attributed the prob-
lem to the weakness of courts and legislatures in the face of advocacy 
groups. “[I]nch by inch, little by little,” Senator Helms grumbled, “the 
homosexual lobby has chipped away at the moral stamina of some of 
America’s courts and some legislators, in order to create the shaky ground 
that exists today that prompts this legislation . . . .”298 Senator Byrd ar-
gued that the push for same-sex marriages had taken the notion of equality 
too far; in his view, it 
reflect[ed] a demand for political correctness that has gone ber-
serk. We live in an era in which tolerance has progressed beyond 
a mere call for acceptance and crossed over to become a demand 
for the rest of us to give up beliefs that we revere and hold most 
dear in order to prove our collective purity. At some point, a line 
must be drawn by rational men and women who are willing to say, 
“Enough!”299
As Senator Byrd’s words indicate, there was also a strong undercur-
rent in the debate, evident in the title of the bill, that something like the 
Defense of Marriage Act was necessary as a matter of self-defense. Like 
adherents of many challenged status regimes before them, members of 
Congress argued that stopping same-sex marriage was essential for “self-
ing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 18 (1996) (statement of Gary L. 
Bauer, President, Family Research Council); Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 90 (1996) (statement of Hadley Arkes, Edward Ney 
Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions, Amherst College); 142 CONG. REC. S10,117 
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Faircloth); id. at H7442 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (state-
ment of Rep. Hutchinson). 
296. 142 CONG. REC. S4948 (daily ed. May 9, 1996); see also id. at S10,068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 
1996) (statement of Sen. Helms); id. at S10,114 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond); id. at S10,104 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles); id. at S10,114 (daily ed. 
Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats). 
297. Id. at H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996). 
298. Id. at S10,068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996). At least one Supreme Court Justice takes a similar 
view. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion is 
the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to 
the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists 
directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”). 
299. 142 CONG. REC. S10,110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996). 
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preservation for our society.”300 Proponents supported the bill as a reason-
able response to “force”—being forced, that is, to recognize status judg-
ments incompatible with the current regime.301
Finally, DOMA’s supporters argued, much like the defenders of ex-
clusion of free blacks in 1821, that norms discouraging same-sex relation-
ships were a lynchpin of the existing status regime. Remove it, several 
members of Congress suggested, and the entire system will collapse—not 
just the system of gender norms, but, as Robert Byrd claimed, all
norms.302 Several members stated their belief that allowing married homo-
sexuals to enter their states would destroy marriage in their states. And “if 
marriage goes,” Representative Jim Talent of Missouri continued, “then 
the family goes, and if the family goes, we have none of the decency or 
ordered liberty which Americans have been brought up to enjoy and to 
appreciate.”303 Similarly, Senator Byrd argued that if legal codes were not 
able to reinforce line-drawing between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, 
it would “make a mockery of those codes themselves.”304 It would force, 
in the words of one advocate before the Senate Judiciary Committee, those 
who wished to retain the old status hierarchy to operate “outside the civil 
300. Id. at S4948 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats); id. at H7275 (statement of 
Rep. Barr) (“We have a basic institution, an institution basic not only to this country’s foundation and 
to its survival but to every Western civilization, under direct assault by homosexual extremists all 
across this country, not just in Hawaii.”); id. at H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Barr) (similar); see also id. at S10,068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms) (suggesting 
that DOMA necessary to defend America against homosexuals bent on its destruction). 
301. Almost every supporter of the bill claimed some version of “resisting force” as a reason in 
favor of the bill. See, e.g., id. at H10,114 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (“I 
can say without reservation that the fine people in my home State of South Carolina should not face 
the possibility of being forced to legally recognize same-sex marriages.”); id. at S10,101 (daily ed. 
Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“To force upon our communities the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriage would be social engineering beyond anything in the American experience.”); id. at 
H7445 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (“It simply says, this is the status quo and no 
one State of the Union can have its decision of its people overridden, run roughshod by people from 
judges from another State.”); id. at H7446 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Talent) (“We 
are saying that the States should not be forced to give the imprimatur of legal sanction to those kinds 
of relationships . . . .”). Even some opponents of the bill stated that they only did so because they 
thought the existing status hierarchies could be enforced without recourse to federal legislation. See id.
at S10,118 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“I would be the first to say, that, 
if one State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, and if any other State is forced to recognize 
same-sex marriages against their own public policy as a result, then Federal legislation would be a 
reasonable course of action.”). For the equivalent antebellum position, see supra note 107. 
302. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,111 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996). Then-Senator John Ashcroft even 
implied that, if same-sex marriages were recognized, there might be no children in the future. See id.
at S10,121 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (“[I]f you don’t have children who grow up to be in the work 
force, who pays for the retirement of those who have already retired?”). 
303. Id. at H7446 (daily ed. July 11, 1996). 
304. Id. at S10,110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996). 
2010] Constitutional Safety Valve 171 
law.”305 It would prevent the law from enforcing the “sign posts . . . for 
responsible behavior” under the current regime.306
Any heated debate over a policy matter features florid rhetoric by leg-
islators. What is significant in the debate over the Defense of Marriage 
Act is the use of not just heated rhetoric but heated rhetoric of a certain 
kind, deploying the same tropes that were used in the antebellum debate 
over free blacks. Then, as now, those debates occurred in the midst of 
changing norms governing the behavior of individuals of a certain type—
blacks and whites then, men and women now—and the emergence of in-
creasing polarization between state societies as a result. 
Unlike the debates over Missouri in 1820–1821, there was little oppo-
sition to the Defense of Marriage Act. It passed by overwhelming majori-
ties in both houses, 85–14 in the Senate and 342–67 in the House, and was 
signed into law by President Clinton. Although attitudes toward same-sex 
marriage have shifted somewhat since 1996, many of the most vocal par-
ticipants in the debate are still in Congress, and there has been little 
change in the substance of the arguments against same-sex marriage rec-
ognition. Quite apart from Congress, there is still deep resistance in many 
states to recognizing such marriages as valid. Spreading acceptance of 
same-sex marriages in some states accompanied by vehement rejection in 
other states threatens to create another status regime conflict irresolvable 
at the national level. 
C. The Privileges or Immunities Clause Rides Again 
The Reconstruction Amendments were passed to ensure that the socio-
legal status of citizenship followed black Americans wherever they went. 
Status determinations by and large remained the province of the states, not 
the federal government,307 but boundaries were set beyond which no state 
could travel. Thus, slavery was abolished, ending forty-five years of de-
bate, and, overruling Dred Scott, all persons born in the United States 
were made citizens of both their state of residence and of the United 
States.308 In a final resolution of the Missouri and Seamen’s Act controver-
sies over free blacks, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited any state from 
abridging “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”309
The Reconstruction Amendments also prohibited any state from denying 
305. Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S.1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 18 (1996) (statement of Gary L. Bauer, President, Family Research Council). 
306. 142 CONG. REC. S4947 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats); see also id. at 
H7447 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
307. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
308. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
309. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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any person due process of law, the equal protection of the laws, or the 
right to vote. 
Despite the evident goal of the Reconstruction Amendments in resolv-
ing the debates that produced the Civil War, the Supreme Court and legal 
commentators still underestimate the importance of the Amendments’ role 
in governing status regulations. The conventional view is that the function 
of the Reconstruction Amendments, in particular the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses, is to protect individuals, by barring certain types of 
government actions—those that make suspect classifications or that abridge 
fundamental rights—rather than provide the unification method only hinted 
at in Article IV. 
But that view of the amendments misses the way in which the amend-
ments, through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, address a crucial 
structural flaw in the original Constitution. It is the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause, more than any other provision, that prevents the very sort of 
conflict that led to the Civil War: a status regime conflict between states. 
Since states still govern (for the most part) the status of individuals 
through laws covering marriage, the family, education, crimes, and so on, 
and since the Equal Protection Clause has been held to apply strict or in-
termediate scrutiny (which is to say, practically speaking, any scrutiny)310
only to a set list of possible targets of discrimination, a serious status re-
gime conflict over a group not on the list will escape the Court’s equal 
protection radar. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause is not the exclusive solution to 
such a conflict. An alternative solution might be simply to add sexual 
orientation to the list of suspect classifications under the Equal Protection 
Clause. The problem with this solution, however, is that the Court lacks a 
theory of change in equal protection. That is, there are no standards telling 
the Court how to determine if the number of suspect classifications has 
increased or decreased over time as a result of changes in society. The 
Court’s only version of such a theory was expressed in a footnote over 
seventy years ago: the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.311 Ostensibly, the Carolene Products footnote offers a 
theory: the Equal Protection Clause combats discrimination based on 
“immutable characteristics” that identify “discrete and insular minori-
ties.”312 As characteristics wax and wane as the target of discrimination, or 
as various minorities become more or less “discrete and insular,” the clas-
sifications subject to heightened review under the Equal Protection Clause 
should also shift. 
310. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (overturning a state constitutional amendment 
on rational basis review). 
311. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
312. Id.
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But the Carolene Products theory, as is well known, is inadequate in 
explaining the actual content of equal protection doctrine. First, while 
often cited, the factors set out in Carolene Products are underinclusive. 
For example, religious classifications are suspect, but religion is hardly an 
“immutable characteristic.” Even sexual orientation is not as immutable as 
might initially appear, regardless of whether it is genetically determined or 
not. As discussed above, the most visible aspects of sexual orientation are 
behaviors—behaviors directed at other individuals. Behavior can be 
masked in a way that other characteristics cannot—gay and lesbian indi-
viduals can, with effort, “cover” their identities.313 A theory of change 
based on “immutable characteristics” might not reach sexual orientation 
no matter how much social change occurs. 
Second, the Court has demonstrated its reluctance to add classifica-
tions to the list or to revisit the decisions it has made in the past. The 
Court’s hesitancy to engage in a direct assessment of the propriety of a 
status injury is understandable, if much lamented. The Equal Protection 
Clause cannot protect against all status injuries, just as it cannot protect 
against all classifications. There are just too many, and most are legiti-
mate. Thus, there must be some way of distinguishing between proper 
status determinations resulting from state action and improper status de-
terminations, and if the line moves over time, there must be some way of 
determining when a given set of status determinations has crossed the line 
from proper to improper. Although the Fourteenth Amendment was in-
tended by its framers to be anti-caste legislation, and although castes 
change, there appear to be few nonsubjective ways of determining when 
change has occurred. In fixating on classifications based on characteristics 
that it seems unfair to ask an individual to change, the Court has adopted a 
set of proxies for unfair status injuries. But it has no way of stepping be-
hind the curtain to evaluate the harm of the status injury itself. 
At least initially, the Court showed some inclination to engage in such 
an analysis. The status impact of state-mandated school segregation was 
the basis for the decision in Brown v. Board of Education and the specific 
ground on which Plessy v. Ferguson was overruled. Loving v. Virginia,314
which struck down laws banning interracial marriages, depended on a sim-
ilar finding. Virginia defended its law on the theory that there was in fact 
no disparate treatment under the law: both blacks and whites were equally 
punished for marrying each other.315 The Court rejected this argument, 
holding that Virginia could not escape the obvious social meaning of its 
law: “[T]he racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as 
313. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2006). 
314. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
315. See id. at 10. 
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measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”316 The high-water mark 
of conducting a contextual assessment of the status impact of state action 
probably came early on, in Hernandez v. Texas:317
[C]ommunity prejudices are not static, and from time to time other 
differences from the community norm may define other groups 
which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists 
within a community is a question of fact. When the existence of a 
distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the 
laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different 
treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guaran-
tees of the Constitution have been violated.318
The Hernandez inquiry relegates all questions of whether equal protection 
has been denied to “a question of fact,” thus providing very few con-
straints on the judge or jury making that decision.319
Since the mid-1970s, however, the Court has been increasingly reluc-
tant to conduct a highly particularized inquiry into whether an alleged sta-
tus injury is improper or not. Instead, the inquiry has hardened into a set 
of rules for identifying situations in which status determinations are likely 
improper—suspect classifications.320 As Justice Powell explained in Bakke,
316. Id. at 11. Although the Court may be reluctant to admit it, Title VII sexual harassment law 
appears to similarly depend on such considerations of context and status. The Court has declared that a 
Title VII plaintiff need not demonstrate “economic” or “tangible” discrimination, see Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986), nor does such a plaintiff have to show a detrimental effect 
on his or her “psychological well-being,” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). The 
Court has not specified what injury is necessary, but seems to have left one remaining possibility: 
harassment is illegal when it creates an intolerable status injury to women, one that “‘alter[s] the 
conditions of the victim’s employment.’” Id. at 21, (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). This conclusion 
is supported by the Court’s repeated reference to the fact that the harm of sexual harassment results 
from “‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’”—actions intended to injure a person’s honor, 
to decrease that person’s status in the community. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. 
at 65). 
317. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
318. Id. at 478. 
319. Id.
320. Outside of such a classification, the Court has been hesitant to recognize equal protection 
violations. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128–29 (1981) (city’s decision to 
close street connecting racially segregated neighborhoods a mere traffic regulation that constitutes one 
of the “routine burden[s] of citizenship”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (plaintiffs 
lacked standing to challenge segregation effects of granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory 
private schools when they were not “personally denied equal treatment”) (quoting Heckler v. Ma-
thews, 465 U.S. 728, 40 (1984)). 
  In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court rejected the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that his 
reputation had been injured by government action. The Court held that the plaintiff had no liberty or 
property interest in his status and therefore a mere status injury could not state a claim under § 1983. 
The Court did so despite clear language to the contrary in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 
436 (1971): 
The only issue present here is whether the label or characterization given a person by 
“posting,” though a mark of serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of 
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the Court has been unable to find a “principled basis” for determining, on 
a rolling basis, which groups have suffered the requisite “prejudice and 
consequent harm” and which have not.321 “The kind of variable sociologi-
cal and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does 
not lie within the judicial competence—even if they otherwise were politi-
cally feasible and socially desirable.”322 Making such heavily context-
based determinations as the Hernandez Court seemed to approve would, 
Powell worried, cause “judicial scrutiny of classifications” to “vary with 
the ebb and flow of political forces.”323
Indeed, the Court has recently backed away even from examining the 
effect of a classification to determine which side bears a status injury—the 
sort of analysis that was crucial to the holdings in Brown and Loving.324
The presumption has instead been that anyone deprived of a benefit based 
on a suspect classification suffers not only the loss of that benefit, but also 
an improper status injury as well.325
In response to the growing challenge of equality for gay and lesbian 
individuals, and stymied by the hidebound nature of equal protection juri-
sprudence, the Court has tried to jury-rig a solution without disturbing the 
existing doctrinal framework. In Romer v. Evans,326 the Court used the 
Equal Protection Clause to strike down a Colorado constitutional amend-
ment banning local governments from prohibiting sexual-orientation dis-
crimination, not because it discriminated against a suspect class, but be-
cause it displayed irrational animus toward a target group—which ostensi-
disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. We 
agree with the District Court that the private interest is such that those requirements of pro-
cedural due process must be met. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Davis, found implausibly that this language in Constanti-
neau referred primarily to the plaintiff’s deprivation of the ability to buy beer. Davis, 424 U.S. at 
708–09. 
321. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296–97 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
322. Id. at 297 (footnote omitted). 
323. Id. at 298. 
324. As Herbert Wechsler once noted, the Equal Protection Clause must require such a determina-
tion, or the Court’s decision in Brown becomes inexplicable. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (“Given a situation where the state 
must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it 
on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution 
demands that the claims for association should prevail?”). 
325. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court struck down a federal program requiring 
minority set-asides in government contracting, holding that “whenever the government treats any 
person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely 
within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.” 515 U.S. 200, 229–
30 (1995). And in recent Voting Rights Act cases, the Court has recognized an injury to white voters 
placed in a majority black district resulting from the use of race as a predominant factor in drawing the 
district. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). “When the State assigns voters on the basis of 
race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of 
their race, ‘think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the 
polls.’” Id. at 911–12 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
326. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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bly could have been any group and just happened to be homosexuals. In 
Lawrence v. Texas,327 the Court found that a Texas statute banning homo-
sexual sodomy violated a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause—the interest in conducting consensual sexual activity between 
adults in the privacy of one’s own home.328
It is possible that the Court could resolve some disputes involving sex-
ual orientation discrimination by further extending the reasoning in these 
two cases. But it would be difficult to extend them far enough to resolve 
disputes over a formalized social status such as marriage. The long history 
of granting marriages only to heterosexual couples means that, without a 
theory of social change, it would be hard to explain how such a longstand-
ing practice became suddenly irrational. And while the private nature of 
sexual activity was the focus in Lawrence, it seems unlikely that that liber-
ty interest extends to legal recognition of the status of marriage.329 It is the 
public nature of the status of marriage that is most beneficial to the reci-
pients330 and most disruptive to inconsistent status regimes. 
Another possible resolution of the conflict would rely on the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of the original Constitution. There are two conceivable 
outcomes under this clause: either ensuring that same-sex marriages travel 
or ensuring that they don’t. Congress and several states have attempted to 
achieve the second outcome by passing state or federal Defense of Mar-
riage Acts. The purpose of the state laws is to attempt to take advantage of 
a purported exemption to Full Faith and Credit where a foreign state act 
violates an important state public policy. In the federal DOMA, Congress 
attempted to use its power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to “pre-
scribe . . . the effect” of state “public acts, records, and judicial proceed-
ings” by providing that same-sex marriages shall have no effect at all.331
327. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
328. See id. at 578. 
329. See id. (case “does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”). Justice Scalia disagreed, see id. at 604 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting), and there is some support for extending Lawrence to same-sex marriage in the majority 
opinion, see id. at 573–74 (decision in Bowers v. Hardwick undermined by Casey v. Planned Parent-
hood, which “confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage . . . [and] family relationships”). However, if a choice of marriage partners 
is a fundamental right that cannot be overcome by any state interest in legislating morality, then Justice 
Scalia’s criticism that Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation,” including laws 
against bigamy, id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting), has considerably more bite. The deprivation seems 
to be more related to the fact that same-sex couples cannot marry, rather than a broad-based interfe-
rence with marriage choice. 
330. Obviously living together in a home as a family is also beneficial—but marriage is no longer a 
prerequisite for such conduct. 
331. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). A different portion of the Act is 
under challenge in two lawsuits, Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., No. 
1:09-11156-JLT (D. Mass. filed July 8, 2009); and Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 1:09-cv-10309 
(D. Mass. filed Mar. 3, 2009). 
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The Full Faith and Credit Clause has not been the subject of an exces-
sive amount of litigation in the more than 200 years it has been in exis-
tence, and there are several unanswered questions concerning its correct 
interpretation. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause in a some-
what inconsistent way: that the Clause imposes a self-executing “iron law” 
of full faith and credit for foreign state judgments but imposes a consider-
ably more flexible rule for “public acts”—that is, statutes.332 The defe-
rence accorded “records” is unresolved, as are the boundaries of Con-
gress’s power under the Effects Clause. 
Some scholars argue that neither state DOMAs nor the federal DOMA 
avoid the requirement to give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages 
performed in other states.333 The full contours of this argument are beyond 
the scope of this Article. But briefly, some scholars claim that the “iron 
law” of full faith and credit was originally intended to apply to statutes334
as well as judgments, or at least that there is no public policy exception for 
full faith and credit to statutes. The Full Faith and Credit Clause therefore 
overrides state laws and constitutional amendments that attempt to block 
enforcement of foreign state marriages. As for the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act, some argue that the first sentence of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause sets a floor that Congress, in specifying the “effect” of an 
act, record, or proceeding, cannot go below.335 That is, while Congress 
could legislate under the clause to provide some effect for same-sex mar-
riages, it has no authority to specify no effect. 
There are some difficulties with this line of argument. First, there is a 
long line of scholarship that suggests that the framers of the original Con-
stitution understood the first portion of the Clause—requiring that “Full 
Faith and Credit . . . be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State”—to refer only to proving 
the content of foreign state judgments, records, and acts, which might 
seem trivial now but was a real problem in the eighteenth century.336 Far 
from setting a floor, these scholars argue, the original design of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause was to leave it entirely to Congress’s determina-
tion what the substantive effect of a foreign state action might be on fellow 
332. See, e.g., Pacific Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of California, 306 U.S. 493, 
500 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). 
333. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997). 
334. There is some question whether marriage is more akin to an act, judgment, or record for 
purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. When a foreign same-sex marriage is presented to a 
state’s authorities, arguably that is a request to give recognition and effect to the foreign state law 
making same-sex marriages valid; it can also be a request to recognize and give effect to the marriage 
certificate issued by the foreign state’s executive authorities. 
335. Scott Rusky-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional 
Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1461 (1997). 
336. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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states through the Effects Clause.337 The antebellum history of conflicts 
over traveling status determinations—both for free blacks and for slave-
holders—provides some ambiguous support for this argument, at least in-
sofar as the original meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is impor-
tant. There is little evidence that anyone argued that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause operated as a self-executing requirement of interstate recog-
nition during the antebellum period. Instead, the public policy exception to 
the norm of comity emerged during the antebellum era as an antislavery 
argument in the North and an anti-black-rights argument in the South. Part 
of the reason for the dearth of discussion of full faith and credit is proba-
bly due to the fact that federal constitutional law generally was an obscure 
and unfamiliar area of the law in the nineteenth century.338 But, that is not 
by itself a sufficient explanation; as we have already seen, the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was often invoked in such situations. It 
seems rather to have been the case that few presumed that the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause required adherence to foreign state actions.339
There is another problem with relying on the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to require recognition of a new, and widely reviled, socio-legal 
status. The problem is that such a rule makes the system unstable. As par-
ticipants in the congressional debate over DOMA noted, if the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause is self-executing and applies to same-sex marriages (or 
any other similarly boundary-pushing grants of legal status), then a change 
in the law of just one state creates, in effect, a new national rule, at least 
when residents of that state travel. The effect of such a rule would be that 
once one state grants a status other states find objectionable, it immediate-
ly becomes national.340 Under most theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the effect of a rule should not have much formal significance in de-
termining what the rule is.341 But a rule that creates instability will lead 
decision-makers, such as judges, to attempt to find ways of mitigating its 
effect, such as recourse in other doctrines—for example, a “public policy” 
exception to full faith and credit.342 That, combined with the historical and 
doctrinal difficulties noted above, may make full faith and credit for same-
sex marriages a long, hard slog. 
The constitutional concern in all of the above cases is that making the 
Equal Protection Clause, the substantive Due Process Clause, or the Full 
337. See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and 
the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 264 (1998). 
338. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 76, at 237–39; Amar, supra note 13, at 1205.
339. This is not to rule out an argument that full faith and credit requires recognition of valid for-
eign-state same-sex marriages; it just makes the argument difficult under one popular mode of consti-
tutional interpretation, that of originalism. 
340. In other words, as Massachusetts goes, so goes the nation. 
341. See Rusky-Kidd, supra note 334, at 1452–53. 
342. See Kramer, supra note 333.
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Faith and Credit Clause broad enough to reach changing status determina-
tions such as same-sex marriage would have much wider ramifications—
either it would open up potentially all status regulation to constitutional 
review or it would make a single state’s social experiment effectively na-
tional. A dynamic system where small perturbations can produce large, 
even catastrophic changes is unstable.343 Consider the two hillsides dia-
grammed below, each with a ball at rest halfway down the slope. In each 
case, the ball is perched at the same height above the valley below. But in 
Figure 1, the amount of force needed to push the ball over the small rise 
to the right is minimal, and the resulting change in its position would be 
drastic. By contrast, the ball in Figure 2 is much more insulated from 
small or even medium-sized disturbances; its resting point is therefore a 
much more stable position. 
TWO HILLSIDES 
 
 Figure 2: More stable 
Unlike a natural system, however, a legal system is run by intelligent 
agents who can respond to instability by making changes to the system. 
Thus, the most likely effect of a doctrine that introduces instability into the 
system is that judges and legislators will act to limit its reach. This re-
sponse can be seen in both Equal Protection Clause and Full Faith and 
Credit Clause doctrine. The Equal Protection Clause is, for the most part, 
limited to a recognized set of suspect classifications. The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause has similarly been interpreted broadly when it comes to 
  
343. In the language of complexity theory, such a system has achieved “criticality.” M. MITCHELL 
WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS 304–05 
(1992). 
Figure 1: Unstable 
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judgments—which involve the behavior of the particular parties before the 
court—but narrowly when it comes to laws, which can formalize status 
determinations that then travel to different states. 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment provided a solution for this 
problem: the Privileges or Immunities Clause. One purpose of the Clause 
was to resolve the antebellum debate over the privileges and immunities to 
be accorded to black northern-state citizens as they traveled—privileges 
and immunities such as the right to enter a state, the right to do business 
there, or the right not to be thrown in jail arbitrarily. Those privileges and 
immunities were denied to black northern citizens on the basis of the 
state’s refusal to recognize blacks as having the socio-legal status of state 
citizen—a distinction the state drew with respect to its own black residents. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause bars that maneuver and requires rec-
ognition, at least where the refusal to recognize a foreign state status de-
termination is similar to the entrenched antebellum conflict over free 
blacks—that is, a status regime conflict. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause thus acts as a sort of safety valve 
that activates when pressure in the federalist system reaches a certain thre-
shold. Based on the history of the debates leading up to the clause, three 
interrelated factors will trigger this sort of Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protection. First, the conflict must involve citizens traveling between 
states. Second, the conflict has to involve a basic socio-legal status recog-
nized throughout the United States. Third, that conflict must have pro-
duced a federalist crisis, with a significant number of states lining up on 
either side—that is, both granting the status and expressly refusing to grant 
the status to the affected group. With respect to same-sex marriage, the 
first two conditions for application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
are present, and the third is building to a boil. 
First, the conflict must involve citizens traveling between states. That 
is because, post-Slaughter-House, the clause does little to regulate how a 
state treats its own citizens, but merely protects the rights of national citi-
zenship at the residual core of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, such 
as the right to travel.344 Like the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Ar-
ticle IV, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause pro-
344. Most of the early cases raising the Privileges or Immunities Clause, including Slaughter-
House itself, involve state citizens suing their own state for violation of their privileges and immuni-
ties. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 130 (1873). Such cases present most starkly the issue of the separation of powers between 
national and state governments. Even if Slaughter-House were someday to be overruled, the difficult 
line-drawing exercise that the Slaughter-House Court avoided would still need to be confronted: name-
ly, providing federal oversight of fundamental freedoms without upending federalism entirely. One 
likely result if Slaughter-House is overturned is to limit the expansion of privileges or immunities of 
United States citizens to those listed in the Bill of Rights. 
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tects the right of U.S. citizens to be treated with respect as equal citizens 
in the states as they travel throughout the nation.345
The Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe recently confirmed the relation-
ship of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the right to travel. The 
Saenz Court identified “at least three different components” to the right to 
travel, protected under different aspects of the Constitution.346 The right to 
“cross state borders,” expressly mentioned in the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the Court found to be at least implicit in the constitutional struc-
ture.347 Second, under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
state citizens have the right not to be unjustly discriminated against when 
they travel to another state on the basis of their residence in another 
state.348 Third, “newly arrived citizen[s]” in a state have a right to “the 
same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same 
State,” protected by the migrant’s “status as a citizen of the United States” 
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.349 A state cannot make distinc-
tions among its citizens based on prior state residence. 
The aspect of the right to travel under consideration here does not 
squarely fit within any of Saenz’s explicitly identified categories, but it is 
consistent with them. Article IV’s right to travel protects the right of trav-
elers from State A to be treated just like equivalently situated residents of 
State B. Saenz’s Fourteenth Amendment right to travel requires that recent 
immigrants from State A be treated just like long-term residents of State 
B. But an additional purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to 
prevent State B from refusing to recognize the legal status of certain citi-
zens from State A, even when State A refused to apply that status to simi-
larly situated State A residents. That is, in some circumstances, the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause limits the categories states can apply to travel-
ers from other states. When the Radical Republicans in Congress sug-
gested that the purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to bol-
ster the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, they had in mind 
controversies like the one over southern Seamen’s Acts. The Fourteenth 
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause therefore bars, as part of its 
protection of the right to travel, states in certain circumstances from apply-
ing categories to travelers that they deploy against their own citizens. 
The circumstances in which this additional protection is triggered are 
limited. Only a refusal to recognize a legal status awarded by another state 
would qualify. This is because only statuses “travel” with an individual. 
Behavior is localized in time and space, and laws or state actions govern-
345. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–02 (1999) (describing aspects of right to travel). 
346. Id. at 500 (emphasis added). 
347. Id. at 500–01. 
348. See id. at 501–02. 
349. Id. at 502. 
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ing such behavior are similarly rooted in certain spatio-temporal con-
texts.350 Actions taken in State A that do not affect State B do not travel 
with a person when he or she passes through State B, and do not thereby 
suddenly change in valence. Statuses, however, are attached to persons, 
not events. A legal status granted to a person by State A does change as 
that person passes through State B where it is not recognized; the status is 
effectively nullified. 
The privileges and immunities of citizens include the privileges and 
immunities associated with certain fundamental legal statuses that citizens 
are entitled to. Certainly such rights qualify under the definition of privi-
leges and immunities propounded in Corfield v. Coryell,351 accepted in 
1866 as the leading authority on the meaning of “Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Citizens in the several States.”352 Under Corfield, the privileges and 
immunities mentioned in Article IV are the rights and freedoms that are 
universally accorded to citizens in every state: 
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privi-
leges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; 
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and 
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the sever-
al states which compose this Union, from the time of their becom-
ing free, independent, and sovereign.353
The right to marry the person of one’s choice qualifies under this defini-
tion. The fundamental “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states” include generally rights to “[p]rotection by the government; the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess proper-
350. This is not to ignore the fact that behaviors can have “spillover effects,” such that an act taken 
by a person in State A at time t has effects in State B at time t+1. Spillover effects can generate 
enormously complex conflicts of law and personal jurisdiction questions. See Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). But even if it is true that a certain action or 
set of actions has cognizable effects in more than one jurisdiction, still those effects do not travel 
around with the actor herself. Nor is travel necessary for such spillover effects to occur. The regula-
tion of behavior by states is thus importantly different from the regulation of legal statuses when it 
comes to travel. 
351. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).  
352. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see e.g. Amar, supra note 13, at 1229; Harrison, supra note 17, at 
1411. Kurt Lash has recently argued that a Maryland case, Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 
(Md. Ct. App. Gen. Ct. 1797), should be viewed as having established the more definitive antebellum 
reading of “privileges and immunities,” one that is narrowly focused on equality and does not include 
any substantive component. See Lash, supra note 32, at 1250. However, as Richard Aynes has subse-
quently demonstrated, Campbell v. Morris is not nearly as strong an authority as Corfield, which 
among other things was cited numerous times during the congressional debate over the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Richard L. Aynes, Article IV and Campbell v. Morris: Wrong Judge, Wrong Court, 
Wrong Holding, and Wrong Conclusion? (Univ. of Akron Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09-13, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1510809. 
353. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
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ty of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject 
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for 
the general good of the whole.”354 Marriage is a legal status granted by the 
state that enables both legal protection of a family unit and “the right . . . 
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety . . . .”355 Furthermore, it is a 
right that is common to all states; the socio-legal status of marriage is both 
universally recognized and is given very similar substantive effect 
throughout the country.356 Nor would such a reading of the phrase “privi-
leges and immunities” anachronistically revive a historical relic; modern 
Supreme Court case law supports the notion that the right to choose who 
one wants to marry is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.357
Slaughter-House and its progeny, of course, famously distinguished 
between privileges and immunities supported by state law and thus attri-
butable to state citizenship, and privileges and immunities supported by 
federal law or the Constitution and thus attributable to United States citi-
zenship. Only the latter, according to Slaughter-House, were protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. And that meant that the vast bulk of legal 
rights, defined and protected as they were by state laws, were beyond the 
scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But, there is a federal com-
ponent to this protection that persists even if most privileges and immuni-
ties are established by state law. Even if most privileges and immunities 
arise from state law, the right of travelers from other states to expect gen-
erally similar treatment as they travel is a right that “owe[s] [its] existence 
to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its 
laws.”358 That is, the recognition of citizens’ privileges and immunities as 
they travel from state to state is itself a privilege of United States citizen-
ship. There is a certain minimum amount of uniformity in the federal sys-
tem, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause acts as a backstop when so-
cial change moves the system toward that threshold. 
354. Id. at 551–52. 
355. Id.
356. Aside from the issue of same-sex marriages, there are minor differences in the qualifications 
for marriage, the procedures for getting married, and the rights and responsibilities that result. But to 
describe these differences as reflecting tremendous variations “in substance, procedures, and struc-
tures,” see LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW
27 (2d ed. 2006), ignores the enormous amount of similarity in marital status across the United States, 
or even throughout most democratic societies. No state recognizes three-person marriages, or requires 
dowries, or applies the doctrine of coverture. None require the slaughter of animals or certain dances 
as part of the ceremony. All recognize some obligation of support within, and after, the marriage, and 
all provide for relatively liberal divorce laws. 
357. See e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
358. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). As Justice Jackson once noted, “it is a 
privilege of citizenship of the United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the 
Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein and for 
gaining resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means nothing.” 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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This aspect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause makes eminent 
sense given its historical context. The experience of the Civil War demon-
strated that inherent in the federal system is a certain minimum amount of 
similarity in social systems. That general similarity between states is a 
privilege or immunity of being a United States citizen—the fact that the 
legal status determinations of one state will be respected in another. For 
example, suppose Texas abolished all recognition of marriages for Texans 
and visiting out-of-state residents alike. Even if Texas could do this for its 
own citizens, denying recognition of such a vital legal and social status 
would not only deter travel through Texas, it would threaten the social 
fabric of the nation. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to 
address precisely this sort of situation. It would require recognition of the 
marriage rights of out-of-state citizens as part of their right to travel 
through the state. 
Obviously there can be variations between the states; that is what it 
means to have a federal system. But when those variations threaten the 
stability of the overall system, as they did prior to the Civil War, the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause would be available as a remedy by placing 
an upper limit on the amount of divergence. This constitutional remedy is 
limited in scope. First, the conflict has to involve the privileges and im-
munities associated with some sort of legal status, one commonly recog-
nized throughout the United States. As noted above, only a legal status can 
cause the requisite level of disruption when the rules for granting or re-
cognizing it vary significantly. Furthermore, not just any legal status will 
do; in order to rise to the level of a privilege or immunity of United States 
citizens, the status in conflict must be one that would be significant to 
travelers. State citizenship, the subject of the antebellum conflict over pri-
vileges and immunities, would be one example; marriage is another. 
There is an additional limit, consistent with the Clause’s history, that 
can be placed on the Privileges or Immunities Clause to alleviate the 
Slaughter-House Court’s concern. The federal right of status uniformity 
should apply only if a federalist crisis is imminent. Thus, even if a funda-
mental legal status is involved, not all variations in the rights associated 
with that status will trigger the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In the 
same way that the Equal Protection Clause offers the greatest protection 
against “suspect” classifications, and the Due Process Clause similarly 
protects fundamental rights, the Privileges or Immunities Clause operates 
at greatest force in the event of a status regime conflict, such as the one in 
the antebellum period. That is, the Privileges or Immunities Clause re-
quires a state to refrain from applying in-state classifications with respect 
to a fundamental legal status to travelers when the legitimacy of that clas-
sification is the subject of a profound dispute between the legal systems of 
the various states. 
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This limitation would require courts to assess when a status regime 
conflict exists. Some of the factors used above to determine the presence 
of such a conflict are imprecise and prone to subjective interpretation.359
But, there are objective manifestations of such a conflict. Status regime 
conflicts show up in the law of the states on both sides—in statutes, and in 
court decisions. If such a conflict exists, it will produce a substantial body 
of statutes and cases granting a legal status to a novel group, on one side, 
and laws or decisions refusing to recognize those grants, on the other. The 
antebellum period saw this sort of conflict emerge with personal liberty 
laws, northern court resistance to recapture of alleged fugitive slaves, 
states embracing or rejecting the doctrine of Somerset v. Stewart,360 south-
ern Seamen’s Acts, state constitutional restrictions on free blacks, and the 
like. Similar manifestations of conflict are beginning to emerge now, with 
some states granting the legal status of marriage to same-sex couples and 
other states formally declaring such a status anathema to their laws. 
More than a few states must be involved on each side before a conflict 
becomes a federalist crisis. A single state’s decision to award a fundamen-
tal status to a new group would not by itself produce a status regime con-
flict. Nor would the existence of sparse opposition in the form of a few 
holdouts qualify as a crisis justifying an overriding national rule under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Rather, there must be a significant body 
of both support and opposition. In the antebellum period, northern states 
generally protected the rights of their black residents through citizenship 
status and through attempts to impose procedural protections for accused 
slaves. Southern and western states similarly adopted measures either ban-
ning traveling free blacks entirely or restricting their movements. That 
conflict was slow to develop and appeared to be fairly static by the time of 
the Civil War, meaning that evolution out of the conflict appeared unlike-
ly. The prospect that confronts us now is a similarly stable divide emerg-
ing between states granting same-sex marriages and those refusing to rec-
ognize them. 
This method of counting states to determine when the conflict has 
reached threshold significance provides a relatively familiar and content-
neutral basis for assessing the existence and extent of social change—one 
that has eluded the Court in other areas. Under the Equal Protection 
Clause, as noted above, the Court has been hesitant to alter the governing 
legal standard to account for changing social context for fear of making it 
amorphous. Under the Due Process Clause, the Court has similarly hesi-
tated to expand the number of fundamental rights applicable against states, 
not even extending them to the limits of the Bill of Rights. The Privileges 
359. See supra text accompanying notes 90–99.
360. See (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB). 
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or Immunities Clause, measuring the existence of a status regime conflict 
to circumstances structurally similar to those prior to the Civil War, con-
tains built-in checks against limitless expansion.  
First, it would apply whenever a status regime conflict over applying a 
common legal status to a new group emerged. For example, suppose that 
instead of same-sex marriages that some other status determination was at 
issue—one more controversial among law professors. Take Justice Har-
ris’s hypothetical in Mitchell v. Wells361 literally, and suppose that in twen-
ty years Ohio’s legislators, impressed by the animal rights movement and 
by research into the cognitive capacities of higher-order primates, pass a 
law declaring orangutans, chimpanzees, and gorillas to have the status of 
personhood under Ohio law—making them citizens of Ohio as well. In the 
absence of a broader social movement pressing for primate rights, that 
isolated change alone would not invoke the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, no matter how many states opposed it.362 But if a significant num-
ber of states followed Ohio’s lead—say, twenty—the refusal to recognize 
that status in other states would produce a federalist crisis. The Privileges 
or Immunities Clause would require states to recognize the personhood of 
traveling orangutans. 
This mechanism of tallying state legal regimes is both relatively objec-
tive and within the competence of federal courts. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court does it in other areas of the law.363 In criminal law, the Court has 
most notably calibrated the availability of the death penalty by whether 
there is a trend of states embracing or rejecting its application in certain 
circumstances.364 The Court has also recently experimented with tentative 
expansions of due process liberty rights using state-counting techniques.365
The development of an entrenched conflict over granting a status to a hi-
therto unthinkable group could be similarly measured by how many states 
line up on either side. The number of states need not be a majority, but it 
would need to be a significant and stable number on both sides with little 
361. 37 Miss. 235, 264 (1859); see supra, note 1. Although Justice Harris’s analogy was intended 
as a slur against the capacities of black Americans, given the vibrant animal rights movement, the 
comparison between primates and humans of any color is no longer unthinkable. See, e.g., Cass R. 
Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333 (1999). 
362. By contrast, there is no threshold number of states to invoke Full Faith and Credit Clause 
protection for applicable acts, records, or judgments. See supra text accompanying notes 340–342. 
363. As one scholar has recently argued, although the Court is most famous for using state count-
ing in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—see, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–24 
(2010)—the technique is far more widespread than that, including equal protection and due process 
cases, and First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendment cases. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptional-
ism of “Evolving Standards”, 57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009). 
364. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005) (30 states prohibit execution of 
juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002) (30 states prohibit execution of mentally 
retarded). In each case, the Supreme Court noted that it was not simply the number of states that 
evidenced a changing national consensus, “‘but the consistency of the direction of change.’” Roper,
543 U.S. at 566 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315). 
365. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–77 (1991). 
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sign of drastic alterations. The isolated conflict would not trigger traveling 
status recognition. But neither would broad and universal social change 
that sweeps through all of the states at different rates. The example there 
is divorce. In the 1940s, significant tensions emerged when a few states—
most famously, Nevada—relaxed their divorce laws, which, when com-
bined with liberal residency requirements, made it relatively simple to 
dissolve a marriage. The trend sparked a considerable amount of contro-
versy, like now, over the obligation of full faith and credit.366 However, 
that conflict was due only to the differential speeds at which a broad social 
change was sweeping through the states. Resolution of the conflict through 
a uniform national rule ultimately proved unnecessary. 
With respect to same-sex marriage, the conditions for triggering the 
protection of such marriages under the right to travel component of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause have not yet been fulfilled. Six states now 
grant such marriages, a few more recognize them, and forty ban them 
entirely by statute or state constitution. There are too few states recogniz-
ing such marriages at this point to produce an entrenched status regime 
conflict. But if those numbers should change, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause provides a resolution to the persistent questions that are likely to 
arise when married couples travel. 
CONCLUSION
The Privileges or Immunities Clause was originally intended as a criti-
cal component of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although sub-
sequent judicial interpretation drastically reduced its original anticipated 
scope, several pieces of the clause remain vibrant. The Privileges or Im-
munities Clause prohibits states from abridging rights inherent in a federal 
system, such as aspects of the right to travel. One aspect of that right that 
has hitherto lain dormant is the right to travel with fundamental state status 
determinations intact: legal statuses such as citizenship, parenthood, and 
marriage.367 This principle was one of the primary motivations for the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, as demonstrated by the repeated refer-
ences to strengthening the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause to 
require recognition of state citizenship rights. 
366. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); 
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); 
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Radin, supra note 116; JACKSON, supra note 56. From 
1901 to 1957, the Supreme Court heard seventeen divorce cases. 
367. Interstate recognition of custody judgments is required under legislation passed pursuant to 
Congress’s authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738a (2006). But for 
most parents, parental status is not confirmed in a judgment issued by a state court; rather, it arises 
through passive operation of state law. 
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The Privileges or Immunities Clause thus fills a crucial gap in our 
constitutional structure. With few exceptions, the federalist structure con-
tinues to leave most determinations of status to states. But national unity 
requires a broad amount of similarity in the social structures of states, 
particularly with respect to status. Without some mechanism for ironing 
out differences that emerge, state societies could evolve in separate direc-
tions, making such differences even more entrenched. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that mechanism. It thus 
serves as a sort of backstop for inconsistencies in social change. That sort 
of change can occur in a variety of ways, only some of which pose the 
potential for grave harm to the system. If a widespread consensus emerges 
that the classification at issue is itself illegitimate for states to use against 
their own citizens, then the result might be an expansion of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, as happened with respect to sex discrimination.368 Alterna-
tively, social change might sweep the nation without need for a national 
legal rule, as in the case of a divorce. Interstate conflicts may simply be 
the result of tension between the leading edge of change and the mass of 
states following behind. Occasionally, however, status regime conflicts 
may become static and entrenched. The Privileges or Immunities Clause 
intervenes in just those situations. 
From 1873 to the present, courts have expressed concern that a vague 
constitutional protection of all state status determinations would lead to 
wholesale obliteration of the distinctions between national and state author-
ity. But drawing from the antebellum conditions that underlay the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, the protection for status determinations is 
inherently limited. It would apply only in what I have called a “federalist 
crisis,” where a substantial number of states begin granting a fundamental 
status to a group considered anathema in a large number of other states. It 
is in such an entrenched status regime conflict that the conditions that led 
to the antebellum crisis over the rights of free blacks are replicated. 
Obviously there are two national rules that could be invoked in such a 
situation: one forcing recognition of the new status determination, the oth-
er barring it. The antebellum history of free black northern citizens ap-
pears to support recognition. Indeed, one of the most infamous decisions 
of the Supreme Court, Dred Scott, attempted to impose the opposite rule. 
However, flip the moral valences and the attractiveness of recognition 
becomes less clear. The antebellum period also featured a sustained con-
flict over the increasing refusal of northern states to recognize the status of 
slave and slaveowner.369 In that case, non-recognition was clearly the mo-
rally superior policy. 
368. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
369. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1984); FINKELMAN, supra note 5. 
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Nevertheless, requiring recognition is the path the Reconstruction 
Congress took. Other aspects of the Reconstruction Amendments rule out 
certain statuses entirely. The Thirteenth Amendment forbids the status of 
slavery. The Equal Protection Clause bars racial and certain other classifi-
cations from being used in the statuses that remain. But for all other status 
determinations, states are free to do as they wish in the absence of a status 
regime conflict. In such cases, recognition serves the purpose of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause in maintaining the uniformity of state societies 
more than nonrecognition, which would permit evolution in opposite di-
rections to continue unabated.370 As the Court noted in its last Privileges or 
Immunities Clause case, Saenz v. Roe:
The Fourteenth Amendment, like the Constitution itself, was, as 
Justice Cardozo put it, “framed upon the theory that the peoples of 
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long 
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”371
∗ ∗ ∗
370. The Equal Protection Clause works in a similar way. See Wechsler, supra note 324, at 34. 
371. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 511 (1999) (quoting Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 
511, 523 (1935)). 
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